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Competition policy provisions for the control of State aid have been in the Treaty from the outset. 
These articles have remained substantially unchanged, but a large body of law and decisional 
practice has evolved. 
The origins of regional aid control go back to the 1956 Spaak Report and ECSC experience with 
subsidies. The Treaty of Rome banned State aid, but allowed for three regional policy related 
exceptions, closely tied to the interests of France, Germany and Italy. There have been a number of 
key drivers in regional aid control. Over time, the European Courts have entrenched key aspects of 
State aid policy through case law. Theories of competitive harm have evolved: in the 1960s and 
1970s, the development of regional aid control was motivated by concerns at competitive outbidding 
and ambitions for a Community regional policy; by the 1990s priorities shifted to competition between 
firms and issues of market structure and dominance. More recent developments give primacy to 
economic efficiency and perceived incentive effect. Accession has forced new Member States to 
adapt regional aid policies, but enlargement has also heavily influenced regional aid control. 
European regional policy and regional aid control are interlinked, but relations are increasingly 
complex. Wider policy agendas have been a key part of the narrative of regional aid control: the 
1992 Single European Market programme, the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 have all been 
influential in different aspects of State aid control.  
The regulatory framework for regional aid falls into two phases: pre-2000 and post-2000. The pre-
2000 period is characterised by an absence of legal clarity, ad hoc decision-making and significant 
departures from published policy positions. Since 2000, regional aid guidelines (RAG) have operated. 
7KHVH KDYH EHHQ HQIRUFHG DV µDSSURSULDWH PHDVXUHV¶ VR KDYH D FOHDU OHJDO EDVLV DQG DUH
characterised by fixed policy cycles determining the parameters of regional aid control timed to 
coincide with Structural Fund plans. SAAP and SAM aimed to focus Commission scrutiny on aid 
VFKHPHV RU PHDVXUHV WKDW UDLVH VHULRXV FRPSHWLWLRQ FRQFHUQV UHVXOWLQJ LQ DQ HPSKDVLV RQ µself-
SROLFLQJ¶ WKURXJKEORFNH[HPSWLRQV with fewer and fewer cases coming before the Commission. 
Maps approved on the basis of the RAG become an integral part of the RAG and form the basis for 
the exemption from notification on the basis of the GBER. Over 60 percent of regional aid 
expenditure is now committed on the basis of GBER exempt schemes. Fewer than 10 regional aid 
schemes and just five individual aid proposals have been scrutinised by the Commission since 2014. 
Spatial coverage has consistently been one of the most controversial aspects of regional aid control. 
Approaches to spatial coverage in regional aid control fall into three distinct phases: in a µEODFNER[¶
phase running from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the Commission took an increasingly 
interventionist, but opaque approach to disciplining regional aid maps; in a second phase starting in 
1988 WKH &RPPLVVLRQ H[SOLFLWO\ GLVWLQJXLVKHG EHWZHHQ µD¶ UHJLRQV DQG µF¶ DUHDV DQG DLPHG WR EH
more transparent about the methodology it had been using. However, the methodology began to 
unravel due to Member State criticism and the discrepancies between national and Structural Fund 
assisted areas. A compromise reached with the German authorities over the post-reunification 
regional aid maps formed the basis for an approach based on overall population ceilings, and this was 
used for the remainder of the 1990s. The 2000-6 Regional Aid Guidelines marked the beginning 
of the third phase where EC-wide population ceilings were set, then distributed among Member 
States which then designated areas subject to the parameters in the guidelines. Subsequent 
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guidelines have maintained overall population coverage discipline and fine-tuned the area designation 
criteria. Over time the impact of competition policy on spatial coverage DQG RQ WKH µVKDSH¶ RI
assisted area maps has been dramatic. 
Commission perspectives on forms of aid are linked to two issues: first, the need to measure and 
compare different types of support ± a grant equivalent; second, the desire to eliminate aid that 
µSURSVXS¶ LQHIILFLHQWDFWLYLWLHVE\VXSSRUWLQJRQJRLQJ H[SHQVHV7KLV OHG WRHDUO\ DFWLRQDJDLQVW VR-
called operating aids in a number of countries, especially on accession. Opposition to operating aid 
contributed to the demise of some major instruments of regional policy, which resulted in a 
progressive narrowing of the forms of aid offered ± by the late 1990s, the main form of regional aid 
was a capital grant in every Member State; operating aid is allowed in only two areas: outermost 
regions and sparsely-populated areas. However, the development of policy on operating aid has been 
tortuous ± sometimes leading to curtailment of major operating aid schemes, but also extension of 
operating aid under the GBER, most notably enabling the compatibility of the Norwegian social 
security concession in a complete reversal of earlier policy.  
The linking of aid intensities to the severity of the regional problem has been a core component of 
regional aid control since the outset. Initially, there was no direct calibration between the two - the 
Commission simply took the prevailing rates in the Member States as a starting point. Until the 2000s, 
Commission ceilings did not bite: 75% NGE was typical in many µD¶ UHJLRQVEXWQRWQHFHVVDULO\
affordable; generally, aid schemes became more discretionary and policymakers more value-
conscious. Since 2000 aid intensities have been lowered across the board both in nominal terms 
and by using gross grant equivalent in place of NGE. This was partly motivated by competition 
concerns, as well as the affordability of high intensities for less prosperous countries. Aid intensities 
are DVORZDV**(LQVRPHµF¶DUHDV raising questions about the µLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶RIDLG  
The Commission was concerned from the outset that large scale regional aid could have 
undesirable effects, but Member States resisted Commission attempts at case-by-case scrutiny. The 
evolution of policy reflects the tensions between the need for transparency and mechanisms that 
capture aids with the most serious effects, and the resource implications of case-by-case scrutiny. 
An important step was the 1997 motor vehicle framework which subjected all regional aid over a given 
threshold to Commission scrutiny. However, Commission ambition was for a multisectoral approach to 
limit capital-intensive aid and balance benefits to regional development against competition effects. 
Its first attempt, the 1998 multisectoral framework (MSF), did not perform as intended. This was 
abandoned in favour of a further multisectoral framework in 2002, which imposed reduction formula 
on aid rate calculations and a notification threshold for exceptionally large projects or awards. This 
has now been integrated into the Regional Aid Guidelines, with some changes to the basis for 
Commission assessment. This comprises a strong incentive to remain under the notification 
threshold as it is increasingly likely that notification will trigger a full investigative procedure. )RU µF¶
areas, large investment projects and large awards are no longer very relevant since RAG 2014-20 
PDLQO\H[FOXGHVDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV except green-field projects. 
In the early years, competition policy control of regional aid was itself perceived as an instrument of 
Community regional, now Cohesion policy, though bespoke European regional policy funding did not 
emerge until after UK accession in 1972. The implementation of the ERDF in the 1970s was 
uncontroversial since it mainly cofinanced nationally selected projects. The 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds raised major issues in State aid relations, primarily relating to spatial coverage, 
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requiring compromise between the DGs for Competition and Regional policies. These tensions 
ultimately dissipated through the extension of Cohesion policy to all regions in 2007-13. Cohesion 
policy State aid relations are now affected by a range of issues that go beyond regional aid due 
to two major underlying trends. First, the notion of State aid has expanded along with the concept of 
economic activities. Second, ESIF interventions now extend beyond basic infrastructure and 
grants to firms, which in the past either did not entail aid or could be accommodated within the 
regional aid rules. State aid has an increasingly high profile in Cohesion policy due to the State 
aid modernisation initiatives (SAAP and SAM), the introduction and expansion of the GBER and the 
µXSJUDGLQJ¶RI6WDWHDLGFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQWKH-20 Common Provisions Regulation. RAG 2014-20 
DQG*%(5 µQRG¶ WRsome Cohesion policy particularities, but a number of issues have been or are 
problematic, including: definitional issues, financial instruments and the treatment of simplified cost 
options. Although many Managing Authorities have bespoke systems for handling State aid, the error 
rate is high. The possibility of audit results in a risk-averse approach to State aid compliance, 
with borderline projects more likely to be funded from domestic sources alone. 
Competition policy concerns with the effectiveness of State aid are comparatively new. They can be 
traced back to the SAAP emphasis on economic analysis and SAM concerns with the efficiency of 
public spending. RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014 enable the Commission to authorise and limit the 
validity of large aid schemes, conditional on the outcomes of evaluation. Several major aid schemes 
are undergoing evaluation; however, the results of these studies and their impact on compatibility are 
as yet unknown.  
Consideration of post-2020 State aid reforms seems to be at an early stage; there is currently no 
µKLJK OHYHO¶ 6WDWH DLG DJHQGD OLNH 6$$3 RU 6$0 WR SURYLGH D leitmotif for possible change. The 
Commission is taking soundings about the future of RAG and GBER, but there are no concrete 
outputs so far. Reapplication of the RAG 2014-20 post-2020 is subject to a large number of variables, 
including population coverage and thresholds, and other factors including data availability and NUTS 
boundary changes, which make outcomes difficult to predict. However, the current eligibility criteria 
VXJJHVWV VRPH FKDQJHV WR µD¶ UHJLRQV with a reduction in some eastern European states, in part 
LQGXFHGE\Dµ%UH[LWHIIHFW¶RQWKUHVKROGVZLWKVRPHVRXWKHUQ(XURSHDQUHJLRQVµUHJDLQLQJ¶µD¶UHJLRQ 
status as a consequence of economic decline.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is 60 years since the Treaty of Rome was signed, setting out the basis for a system of subsidy or 
µ6WDWH DLG¶ FRQWURO WKDW UHPDLQV XQLTXH 0XFK KDV FKanged in the intervening period: the Treaty 
provisions on State aid have spawned an evolving body of case law, hard and soft law and decisional 
practice that operates in an economic, political and geographical context which the authors could 
scarcely have imagined.  
The Treaty articles themselves remain practically unaltered. The basic provisions underpinning the 
control of regional aid have been interpreted and adapted against the backdrop of changing economic 
and political circumstances, successive enlargements and the emergence of European regional, now 
Cohesion policy, as well as shifts in Commission and domestic thinking about the role of business 
subsidies in economic development. 
The control of State aid for regional development is set to enter another period of reflection. The key 
texts ± the Regional Aid Guidelines and the General Block Exemption Regulation ± are set to expire 
at the end of 2020, a schedule timed to coincide with the next round of Cohesion policy programming, 
which itself is already under review. These texts are important, and will continue to frame the main 
parameters of both domestic and Cohesion policy interventions. However, there has been a 
ZLGHVSUHDG UHWUHDW IURP WKH XVH RI µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ UHJLRQDO DLGV SDUWO\ GXH WR FRPSHWLWLRQ FRQWUROV LQ
IDYRXU RI µVRIWHU¶ IRUPV RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ VXFK DV VHUYLFH RU LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURYLVLRQ; in the context of 
domestic policy, much of this is beyond the purview of State aid control. In the case of Cohesion 
policy, intervention has also diversified beyond infrastructure and aid to productive investment, which 
were the mainstay of past Structural Fund interventions, to softer forms of support, including advisory 
services, support for research and innovation, social enterprises and business-related infrastructures. 
Also, and DW WKHEHKHVWRI WKH&RPPLVVLRQ WKHUHKDVEHHQ LQFUHDVLQJHPSKDVLVRQPRUH µPDUNHW-
EDVHG¶PHDVXUHV LQ WKH IRUPRI VR-called financial instruments. At the same time, State aid control 
has extended into areas once considered beyond its scope, notably services or infrastructure 
traditionally provided by the State, but which may now be considered to involve economic activity. 
This has broadened the reach of what is subject to State aid control into areas where there is limited 
guidance or decisional practice, often creating uncertainty for those involved in policy implementation, 
especially in a more intensive audit climate.  
Ironically, perhaps, the competition rules arguably now therefore have as many, if not more, 
implications for Cohesion policy than for purely domestic regional policy. This partly arises from the 
multifaceted nature of Cohesion policy intervention which may involve complex assessments about 
ZKHWKHU6WDWHDLG LV LQYROYHGDQGSRWHQWLDO µIRUXPVKRSSLQJ¶ZKHUH LW LV ,QDGGLWLRQ Whe scrutiny to 
which Cohesion policy intervention may be subjected through the audit process throws into sharp 
relief the penalties for getting such assessments wrong. 
This paper takes the opportunity to look back at the origins and impact of State aid control on regional 
development policy. Taking a historical and thematic perspective, it explores the key drivers of 
change and their effects over the last six decades. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of 
future issues and raises some questions for discussion. 
.
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2. KEY DRIVERS IN REGIONAL AID CONTROL 
x The origins of regional aid control go back to the 1956 Spaak Report and ECSC experience 
with subsidies. 
x Treaty of Rome banned State aid, but allowed for three regional policy related exceptions 
closely tied to the interests of France, Germany and Italy. 
x Theories of competitive harm underpinning regional policy control have changed. 
x 1960s and 1970s development of regional aid control was motivated by concerns at 
competitive outbidding and ambitions for a Community regional policy. 
x By the 1990s concern shifted to competition between firms and issues of market structure 
and dominance. 
x More recent developments give primacy to issues of economic efficiency and perceived 
incentive effect. 
x Accession has forced new Member States to adapt regional aid policies, but enlargement 
has also heavily influenced regional aid control. 
x European regional policy and regional aid control are interlinked, but relations are 
increasingly complex. 
x Wider policy agendas have been a key part of the narrative of regional aid control: 1992 
6LQJOH(XURSHDQ0DUNHW/LVERQ6WUDWHJ\(XURSH« 
x European Courts KDYHHQWUHQFKHGNH\DVSHFWVRISROLF\VXFKDVµD¶UHJLRQDQGµF¶DUHD
definition. 
 
The current basis for the competition policy treatment of regional aid can be traced back to the Spaak 
report published in 1956.1 The committee charged with developing proposals for the European 
Economic Community (EEC) implicitly rejected the approach under the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSC) which had outlawed the use of national subsidies. The ECSC experience 
made clear that some exceptions to a general prohibition would be needed otherwise the EEC rules 
ran the risk of being ignored as the ECSC provisions had been.2 Reflecting this, the Spaak report 
proposed a general ban on State aid, but also identified areas, including regional aid, which would or 
might fall outside such a ban.  
The extracts below (see Figure 1) shows clearly the extent to which the Spaak report was a 
forerunner to the Treaty of Rome provisions on State aid - its approach to prohibiting aid was adopted 
largely unchanged as Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty.3 However, its provisions on measures that 
would fall out of the scope of State aid and those on regional development were subject to 
considerable negotiation. 
                                                     
1
 Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Méssine (1956) Rapport des chefs de délégation aux 
ministres des affaires étrangères, Brussels, 21 April.  
2
 Piernas López, J J (2015) The Concept of State aid under EU law: from internal market to competition and 
beyond, Oxford University Press.  
3
 Now Article 107(1) TFEU, 
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Figure 1: The Spaak report ±precursor to Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome 
 
 
 
In the course of the Treaty negotiations the Spaak report proposals on regional development aid 
evolved into three distinct exemptions from the prohibition ± one under the mandatory exemptions, in 
favour of the so-FDOOHG µ]RQDO ERUGHU DUHD¶ LQ *HUPDQ\ $UWLFOH F DQG WZR XQGHU WKH
discretionary provisions (Article 92(3)(a) and (c)). Here, it is important to recall that negotiations were 
among just six Member States, and the influence of the three large countries was apparent: Germany, 
in the case of the zonal border area; Italy, where there were specific concerns about the 
competitiveness of the south and for which the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno had not long been 
established (1950) - KHQFHWKHSURYLVLRQIRUµD¶ regions; and France, where Claudius-3HWLW¶V1950 Pour 
un plan national d'aménagement du territoire would lay much of the foundations of thinking on 
regional policy and the location of economic activity in years to come. 
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Figure 2: Article 92 of the EEC Treaty and the regional aid exemptions 
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.  
2. The following shall be compatible with the common market:  
 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, 
provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the 
origin of the products concerned;  
 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences;  
 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic 
of Germany affected by the division of Germany, insofar as such aid is 
required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by 
that division.  
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the common 
market:  
 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard 
of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment;  
 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common 
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State;  
 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or 
of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;  
 
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the 
Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
Against the background of these Treaty articles, regional aid was the first policy area in which the 
European Commission developed its mandate to regulate State aid. In the 1960s, the initial 
Commission proposals involved the case-by-case scrutiny of regional investment aid to assess the 
effects on competition and set the amount of aid.4 This was rejected by Member States ± though 
clearly elements of the approach resurfaced later and are present in WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V DQDO\VLV RI
individual cases today. The first formal steps to regulate regional aid were not taken until the 1970s 
and the beginnings of a systematic policy did not emerge until the late 1980s.  
Figure 3 summarises the main policy developments in the control of regional aid, along with wider 
developments that have been influential in shaping policy.  
                                                     
4
 Commission of the European Communities (1972) First Report of Competition Policy, Luxembourg. 
   
Figure 3: The evolution of regional aid control 1957-2017 
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The first steps in regional aid control were partly motivated by concerns at competitive outbidding for 
PRELOHLQYHVWPHQWWKHUHVWUXFWXULQJRIPDQ\µWUDGLWLRQDO¶LQGXVWULHVwas leading some Member States 
to attract inward investment through State aid.5 This was linked to aspirations for a Community 
regional policy6 - competition policy control of regional aid has always been perceived by the 
Commission as contributing to the reduction of regional disparities. The origins and evolution of 
regional aid control are also closely interlinked with other geopolitical developments and wider policy 
objectives.7  
Successive enlargements of the European Community / Union have been instrumental: State aid 
control has not only shaped the regional economic development policies of every new Member State, 
but has itself also had to adapt to new economic geographies, such as the much poorer regions of the 
Iberian peninsula in the 1980s or the sparsely-populated areas of the Nordic countries in the 1990s. 
Later still, enlargement to EU25 required the recalibration of existing approaches to approving 
assisted areas in order to accommodate a large number of less prosperous countries. Enlargement 
has also influenced the regulatory architecture of State aid control: the Europe Agreements of the 
1990s onwards required the pre-accession States to establish national monitoring authorities to µVHOI-
SROLFH¶6WDWHDLGRQWKHEDVLVRI(&6WDWHDLGUXOHVWith accession, formal responsibility for State aid 
control passed to the Commission. However, the pre-accession approach had provided a model 
whereby Member States could play a greater role in State aid discipline, culminating in the adoption of 
Block Exemption Regulations in the early 2000s.  
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the European Commission had initiated a number of studies with a 
view to laying the foundations of a bespoke European regional policy. None of this bore fruit at the 
time ± the ERDF was not established until 1975 in the wake of UK accession - but some of the ideas 
did filter through into the control of regional aid, which was itself perceived by the Commission to be a 
component of regional development policy. Moreover, since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds 
the two policy areas have exerted considerable influence over one another. Since 2000, the 
multiannual schedules of the Regional Aid Guidelines and Cohesion policy programmes have been 
aligned; the definition of the least prosperous regions ± WKH µD¶ UHJLRQV DQG WKH /HVV-developed 
regions ± is the same; and RAG 2014-20 makes some explicit adjustments in favour of Cohesion 
policy. That said, and as noted earlier, the multi-faceted nature of Cohesion policy means not only 
that assessments of whether State aid is involved can be cRPSOLFDWHGEXWDOVRWKDWµIRUXPVKRSSLQJ¶
beyond the regional aid rules is required to ensure compliance.  
Wider internal market and competition policy issues have been key. The White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market,8 together with the Padoa-Schioppa9 and Cecchini10 reports, had 
                                                     
5
 Jordan, J (1976) The compatibility of regional aid systems with the Common Market, European Law Review, 
236-242. 
6
 Commission of the European Communities (1969) A regional policy for the Community, OOPEC, Luxembourg.  
7
 Wishlade, F (2003) Regional State Aid and Competition Policy in the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague. 
8
 Commission of the European Communities (1985) Completing the Internal Market: White paper from the 
Commission to the Council, OOPEC, Luxembourg. 
9
 Padoa-Schioppa, T (1987) Efficiency, Stability and Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System 
of the European Community, report to the President of the European Commission.  
10
 Cecchini, P et al (1988) The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market, Wildwood House, 
Aldershot.  
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stressed the need for strict control of State aids in the context of an internal market: in the absence of 
other forms of protectionism, ZKLFKWKHµSURJUDPPH¶was intended to outlaw, the impact of State 
aids was considered likely to increase and Member States were perceived to be tempted to boost 
spending on aid with a view to protecting or promoting national industries or attracting inward 
investment. These concerns culminated in an extensive survey of the State aids being offered by 
Member States. Only a summary of expenditure, as opposed to a full catalogue of schemes was 
published.11 However, the information collected was used by the Commission to scrutinise and 
ultimately curtail or eliminate a number of major so-FDOOHGµJHQHUDO¶LQYHVWPHQWDLGVFKHPHV for large 
firms that had operated outside the assisted areas and formed the beginning of a more systematic 
approach to dealing with support for large firms under regional aid schemes too. Wider State aid 
policy developments have also been linked to high level policy aims: the 2005 State aid action plan 
(SAAP)12 was part of the wider Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, and aimed to achieve µless and 
better targeted aid¶, a refined economic approach and shared responsibility between the Commission 
and Member States in enforcement. These aims fed into important changes in regional aid control in 
relation to lower assisted area coverage, more sophisticated scrutiny of aid to large investment 
projects and the Block Exemption Regulation for regional aid. The successor to SAAP, the 2012 State 
aid modernisation initiative (SAM)13 was developed in the wake of the financial and economic crisis 
and linked to the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. SAM initiated a 
range of reforms, including a significant extension to GBER 2014 so that very few regional aid 
schemes now require ex ante scrutiny and approval by the Commission (or ESA). It also emphasised 
WKHQHHG IRU µLQFHQWLYH HIIHFW¶ ZKLFK IHG WKURXgh into the exclusion of large firms from eligibility for 
LQYHVWPHQWDLGLQµF¶DUHDs in RAG 2014-20, and formed the basis for the requirement for evaluation 
plans for schemes with large budgets in GBER 2014.  
The Commission has wide discretion in the interpretation of the State aid rules, but that discretion is 
not unfettered. Various rulings from the European Courts, whether confirming or constraining the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDSSURDFKKDYHHQWUHQFKHGYDULRXVDVSHFWVRISROLF\)RUH[DPSOHcase law from the 
1980s14 VHUYHG WR HPEHG WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µD¶ UHJLRQV DQG µF¶ DUHDV ZLWK WKH IRUPHU WR EH
assessed in relation to the Community average and to concern ³only areas where the economic 
situation is extremely unfavourable in relation to the Community as a whole´15 This in turn formed the 
EDVLVIRUDILUVWGHILQLWLRQRIµD¶UHJLRQVLQ,16 which has remained largely unchanged ever since.  
7KHVHµGULYHUV¶RISROLF\FKDQJHKDYHFRQWULEXWHGWRVRPHLPSRUWDQWVKLIWVLQWKHHYROXWLRQRIUHJLRQDO
aid control, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
                                                     
11
 Commission of the European Communities (1988) First Survey on State Aids in the European Community, 
SEC(88)1981, 13 December 1988. 
12
 European Commission (2005) State aid action plan: less and better targeted aid ± a roadmap for State aid 
reform 2005-2009, COM(2005)107 final.  
13
 European Commission (2012) EU State aid modernisation, COM(2012)209 final.  
14
 Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 2671; Case 
248/84 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities [1987] ECR 4013. 
15
 Case 248/84 at p 4042.  
16
 Commission communication of the method for the application of Article 93(3)(a) and (c) to regional aid, OJEC 
C212 of 12 August 1988. 
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Figure 4: Key developments in regional aid control 
 Key features Application 
Principles of the 
1970s 
Set out principles in relation to: 
x aid ceilings 
x transparency (essentially 
µPHDVXUDELOLW\¶ 
x UHJLRQDOµVSHFLILFLW\¶ 
x sectoral repercussions 
x Initially tentative: existing maps taken as 
EDVLVIRUGHILQLQJµFHQWUDO¶DQGSHULSKHUDO
areas 
x Prevailing aid ceilings in peripheral 
areas generally retained 
x Stance quickly toughened: Com 
sometimes imposed map on MS; or 
required withdrawal of operating aid 
x No MS regional policy untouched by 
Com (maps and forms of aid) 
x Com decision-making very lengthy and 
opaque 
1988 
Communication 
(1994 amendment) 
x ([SOLFLWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµD¶UHJLRQV
DQGµF¶DUHDV 
o µD¶UHJLons NUTS 2 regions 
GDP(PPS) ph <75% of EC av 
o µF¶DUHDVEDVHGRQ(&-adjusted 
indices of GDP & unemployment 
x Mix of net and gross grant equivalent 
ceilings; prevailing rate widely used 
x Enlargement (FI, SE) + NO EEA results 
in provision made for sparsely-
populated regions (NUTS 3 12.5 inh 
per km2) in 1994 
x Published in recognition of growing 
resentment at lack of transparency, 
1988 method had been used by Com 
since early 1980s! 
x Maps reviewed 3-5 year cycles; still 
controversial ± but now critique of 
method as well 
x Method began to unravel due to: 
o Lack of coincidence between 
national and Structural Fund assisted 
areas (DG Regio DG Comp discord) 
o DE reunification - forced more 
flexibility: population ceiling approach 
piloted with DE in 1991 
RAG 2000-6 x First legal basis for regional aid control; 
application for fixed timescale 
x EU15 population ceiling: 42.7% 
x Top-GRZQGHILQLWLRQRIµD¶UHJLRQV 
aligned with Objective 1 
x µc¶DUHDSRSXODWLRQshared between MS 
(on basis of 1988 Communication 
index), then adjusted (inc for sparsely-
populated areas) 
x 06VHOHFWµF¶DUHDVVXEMHFWWRVWULFW
quantitative parameters 
x Reduction in aid intensities 
x Principles re population ceiling had 
been applied since early 1990s, but not 
made explicit 
x Needed to adapt to Structural Fund 
map issues and upcoming enlargement 
(EULQPDLQO\µD¶UHJLRQV 
x Reduction in spatial coverage in EU15 
x ,PSRVHGWKURXJK$UWµDSSURSULDWH
PHDVXUHV¶ 
x Map negotiation highly contentious in 
some MS [including legal challenge to 
outcome and methodology by DE]. 
RAG 2007-13 x Broad continuation of RAG 2000-6 
x EU25 population ceiling 43.1% (46.6% 
of EU27) 
x Area designation parameters relaxed 
x Reduction in aid intensities and use of 
gross grant equivalent 
x 5HSRUWLQJRIDLGWRSURMHFWV!¼P 
x Less radical than RAG 2000-6, but 
VLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRIHQODUJHPHQWRQµD¶
regions in EU15 (statistical effect) 
x Incorporates 2002 Multisectoral 
framework on large awards 
x Regional BER adopted so few aid 
schemes scrutinised by COM; GBER 
supersedes RBER in 2009 
RAG 2014-20 x Broad continuation of RAG 2007-13 
x LDUJHO\H[FOXGHVDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶
areas 
x Increased population coverage ± 47% 
of EU28 
x Reduction in aid intensities 
x Links to Cohesion policy strengthened 
x Transparency ± UHSRUWLQJRIDLG!¼P 
x Scope to link aid scheme approval to 
evaluation 
x GBER extended to include almost all 
regional aid ± some operating aid and 
individual cases fall under RAG 
x Little incentive to notify individual cases 
as investigative procedure very likely 
x 2017 GBER amendment extends 
coverage of operating aid 
 
The key elements of regional aid control have been present since the formulation of policy in the early 
1970s, namely UHJLRQDOµVSHFLILFLW\¶WKHQHHGIRUDLGWREHµPHDVXUDEOH¶ZLWKLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHIRUP
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of aid, the calibration of aid intensity to the severity of the regional problem and a consideration of 
sectoral and competition issues. These remain the core of policy, but have been complemented by an 
increasingly formal framework, coordination with an evolving European regional policy, emphasis on 
reporting and an emerging focus on effectiveness. The sections below identify the main thematic 
trends in policy evolution.  
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3. REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE 
x The regulatory framework for regional aid falls into two distinct phases: pre-2000 and post-
2000. 
x The pre-2000 period is characterised by an absence of legal clarity, ad hoc decision-making 
and significant departures from published policy positions. 
x Since 2000, regional aid guidelines (RAG) have operated. These have been enforced as 
µDSSURSULDWHPHDVXUHV¶VRKDYHDFOHDUOHJDOEDVLVDQGDUHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\ fixed policy 
cycles determining the parameters of regional aid control timed to coincide with Structural 
Fund plans.  
x SAAP and SAM aimed to focus Commission scrutiny on aid schemes or measures that 
UDLVHVHULRXVFRPSHWLWLRQFRQFHUQVUHVXOWLQJLQDQHPSKDVLVRQµVHOI-SROLFLQJ¶WKURXJKEORFN
exemptions with fewer and fewer cases coming before the Commission. 
x Since 2006 the regional aid guidelines have been complemented by block exemption 
regulations. Maps approved on the basis of the RAG become an integral part of the RAG 
and form the basis for the exemption from notification on the basis of the GBER. 
x Over 60 percent of regional aid expenditure is now committed on the basis of GBER exempt 
schemes. 
x Fewer than 10 regional aid schemes and just five individual aid proposals have been 
scrutinised by the Commission since 2014. 
 
The regulatory architecture for regional aid control can be divided into two distinct phases. The early 
years were characterised by a distinctly ad hoc approach to regional aid control. In the 1970s various 
Communications set out the key principles on spatial coverage, rates of award and form of aid, and by 
the late 1980s, the Commission had intervened in relation to the maps and form of regional aid in 
virtually every Member State. However, actual Commission practice often departed markedly from its 
own guidelines, fuelling resentment among domestic policymakers at the opaqueness of decision-
making. Transparency increased under the 1988 Communication17 which included a method for 
approving assisted areas which the Commission had been using for some time. However, by the mid-
1990s, Commission practice had departed from this Communication too. By the late 1990s, it was 
clear that reform was required. In principle, the 1988 Communication still applied, but in practice the 
Commission had adopted a different approach, based on population ceilings, which it had piloted with 
the German authorities in the period following reunification. At the same time, discrepancies between 
the assisted areas for the now comparatively mature Community regional policy had increased 
tensions within the Commission, and the prospect of enlargement called for a more systematic 
approach.  
                                                     
17
 Commission communication of the method for the application of Article 93(3)(a) and (c) to regional aid, OJEC 
C212 of 12 August 1988. 
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Figure 5: From soft law to hard law ± evolution of the regional aid framework 
1971 to 1999 From 2000 
Several communications ± 1971, 1973, 1975, 1979, 
1988, 1994. 
Regional aid guidelines (RAG 2000-6; RAG 2007-13; 
RAG 2014-20) 
Legal basis unclear.  Successive RAGs imposed on the Member States as 
µDSSURSULDWHPHDVXUHV¶ under Article 108(1) TFEU.  
From 2006 block exemption regulations.  
No end date. Each Communication supplements but 
does not replace its predecessor 
RAG 2000-6 explicitly replaces all related 
Communications from 1971-1999.  
Each RAG specifies its duration.  
Commission practice departs from stated policy. 
Regional aid relations are essentially bilateral.  
Regional aid guidelines also bind the Commission and 
apply to all Member States simultaneously. 
Map and scheme scrutiny by Commission is ad hoc, 
typically triggered accession or by notified changes. 
Decision times lengthy, sometimes involve 
Commission imposing maps on Member States and 
often long transitional periods. 
RAG 2000-6 explicitly terminated validity of existing 
maps and required new maps and schemes to be 
notified and approved prior to implementation.  
Map approval under RAGs is for duration of RAG. 
Introduction and expansion of block exemption 
regulations means that COM rarely needs to scrutinise 
aid schemes, but map approval is key as provides 
spatial coverage and associated award rates. 
 
A second phase began with the 2000-6 Regional Aid Guidelines,18 which were a landmark in regional 
aid control. They were imposed on all Member States by means of (then) Article 93(1) appropriate 
measures, thereby withdrawing the existing maps at the end of 1999 and applying the same period of 
validity to all national assisted area maps. Subsequent regional aid guidelines (for 2007-13 and 2014-
20) have operated in the same way. Crucially, these have been complemented by so-called block 
exemption regulations which have meant that, once the regional aid maps and award rates are 
approved under the RAG, the Commission now rarely has occasion to examine either regional aid 
schemes or individual awards.  
Figure 6: Regulatory framework for regional aid control 
 
Source: EPRC 
                                                     
18
 Guidelines on national regional aid, OJEC C74/9 of 10 March 1998. 
RAG ± overarching framework 
Maps 
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scope 
Key 
conditions 
GBER ± presumed compliance 
Transparency 
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Projects 
RAG ± notification & 
compatibility assessment 
Non-GBER individual 
aid 
Non-GBER aid 
schemes 
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Indeed, under RAG 2014-20, it appears that the Commission has examined fewer than 10 aid 
schemes19 and just five individual cases.20 The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) performs the same 
functions for the EEA members and here too most schemes fall within the GBER (though ESA was 
responsible for handling the single largest notified scheme, this being the Norwegian social security 
concession (RDSSC)). In GBER 2014-20 notification is essentially limited to schemes that lack the 
transparency to fall under the GBER; moreover, GBER 2014-20 also extends the scope of exempted 
ad hoc regional aid, so that fewer individual awards would fall to be considered under the regional aid 
guidelines. This is reflected in the declining proportion of spend on notified (as opposed to block-
exempted) regional aid (see Figure 7), though in absolute terms the former remains surprisingly high.  
Figure 7: Share of regional aid under block-exempted measures (EU28) 
 
Source: EPRC calculations from European Commission State Aid Scoreboard: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html  
                                                     
19
 In addition to approving the regional aid maps and associated aid rates for each country. 
20
 $FFRUGLQJWR'*&RPSHWLWLRQ¶VUHJLVWHURIFDVHVDVDWHQG$XJXVW
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3  
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4. SPATIAL COVERAGE 
x Spatial coverage has consistently been one of the most controversial aspects of regional 
aid control. 
x Approaches to spatial coverage in regional aid control fall into three distinct phases.  
x ,QDµEODFNER[¶SKDVH running from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the Commission took 
an increasingly interventionist but opaque approach to disciplining regional aid maps. 
x In a second phase starting in 1988, the CRPPLVVLRQH[SOLFLWO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGEHWZHHQµD¶
UHJLRQVDQGµF¶DUHDVDQGaimed to be more transparent about the methodology it had been 
using. 
x The methodology began to unravel due to Member State criticism and the discrepancies 
between national and Structural Fund assisted areas.  
x A compromise reached with the German authorities over the post-reunification regional aid 
maps formed the basis for an approach based on overall population ceilings, and this was 
used for the remainder of the 1990s. 
x The 2000-6 Regional Aid Guidelines marked the beginning of the third phase where EC-wide 
population ceilings were set, then distributed among Member States which then designated 
areas subject to the parameters in the guidelines. 
x Subsequent guidelines have maintained overall population coverage discipline and fine-
tuned the area designation criteria. 
x Over time the impact of competition policy on spatial coverage has been dramatic. 
 
The spatial coverage of regional aid has been one of the most controversial elements of State aid 
control since the outset. Three distinct phases in the development of policy can be distinguished.  
In a first µEODFNER[¶SKDVH, the starting points for the Commission were the existing assisted area 
maps of the Member States, but its initial focus was on controlling regional aid in the so-called central 
areas and containing Member State attempts to extend assisted area coverage. Thus, as far back as 
1971, the Commission objected to State aid in Nordrhein-Westfalen which the Land authorities had 
initially offered in coal-closure areas, but wanted to extend throughout the Land. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the Commission approach to assessing assisted area coverage was opaque and regional aid 
map relations with the Member States consequently often fraught. The Commission also on occasion 
imposed its own regional analysis when countries sought to amend assisted area maps or in the 
context of its periodic reviews.  
Figure 8: Phases in the development of Commission policy on spatial coverage 
 Basis Key features 
µ%ODFNER[¶
decision-
making on 
spatial 
coverage 
1971 resolution x Distinguished central and peripheral regions (latter were: FR prime 
de développement industriel areas; IT Mezzogiorno; DE: Berlin 
and Zonenrandgebiet). Initially control only covered central 
regions.  
x Regional aid should not cover entire national territory (except 
Luxembourg) 
x Boundaries of eligible areas should be identified clearly 
x Regional aid should not involve pinpointing (except in the case of 
growth poles) 
1975 
communication 
x Distinguished 5 categories of region: 
1. Greenland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Mezzogiorno 
2. West Berlin and Zonenrandgebiet 
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 Basis Key features 
3. Prime de développement industriel areas (FR); assisted areas 
in Centre-North (IT); assisted areas (UK) 
4. Northern development area, Bornholm, &Frø, Samsø and 
Langeland (DK) 
5. µ2WKHUUHJLRQV¶ 
Methodology 
exposed, but 
increasingly 
abandoned 
in practice 
1988 
Communication 
x Explicit GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµD¶UHJLRQVDQGµF¶DUHDV 
x µD¶UHJLRQVDUH1876UHJLRQVZKHUHPRVW1876UHJLRQVKDYH
GDP(PPS) per head below 75% of EC average 
x µF¶DUHDVEDVHGRQWZRVWDJHDQDO\VLV 
1. NUTS 3 regions with either GDP(PPS) per head below the 
national threshold or unemployment rate above the national 
threshold. Thresholds set per country to reflect national 
situation in a community context.  
2. Scope to take other indicators into account. 
x 1994 Communication recognises sparsely-SRSXODWHGDUHDVDVµF¶
areas 
Population 
ceilings and 
µD¶UHJLRQs 
drive 
coverage 
Regional aid 
guidelines (from 
2000) 
x Sets an EC wide population ceiling on initial coverage 
x Top-GRZQGHILQLWLRQRIµD¶UHJLRQV1876ZLWK*'3336SHU
head <75% of EC average 
x Remaining eligible population divided between MS on basis of 
6WDJHRI&RPPXQLFDWLRQµF¶DUHDPHWKRGVXEMHFWWR
µDGMXVWPHQWV¶ 
x Greater apparent freedom for Member States in area designation 
 
The publication of the 1988 Communication marked a second phase and was an important turning 
point. It was driven by a number of factors: there was Commission recognition that the lack of 
transparency in map decisions had bred resentment and that there was a need for greater 
cooperation; enlargement to include Spain and Portugal had widened existing disparities; the Single 
European Act introduced new provisions on economic and social cohesion, and these were 
underpinning the reform of the Structural Funds. Reflecting a recent court ruling, the 1988 
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ PDGH H[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFH WR µD¶ UHJLRQV DQG µF¶ DUHDV In practice, however, the 
publication of the methodology exposed it to Member State criticism, especially in relation to its over-
reliance on quantitative indicators. A long-running dispute between the Commission and France in 
the early 1990s provides a good illustration of the arguments espoused by many Member States. 
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Figure 9: Negotiation of the French SULPHG¶DPpQDJHPHQWGXWHUULWRLUHmap 1990-95 
The issues arose from the Commission examination of the SULPH G¶DPpQDJHPHQW GX WHUULWRLUH (PAT) map 
undertaken as part of its regular review process. This resulted in the Commission proposing as appropriate 
measures that substantial parts of the French assisted areas map - notably large parts of western and south-
western France - be dedesignated.21 This met with considerable opposition from the French authorities, because 
the changes proposed did not take into account the nature of the regional problem. One of the principal aims of 
French regional policy was to counter the domination of Paris and to support areas with a declining population. 
Such areas predominated in south-western France, which the Commission proposed to dedesignate. However, 
the problems faced by such regions did not show up in measures of unemployment and GDP per head used by 
the Commission.  
The use of unemployment data for rural areas was regarded as inappropriate since many such areas are 
characterised by strong out-migration trends. This can result in unemployment rates below the national average, 
but which reflect the lack of job opportunities rather than a buoyant local economy. Moreover, these migration 
patterns contribute to higher unemployment in urban areas. In the French context, the case for maintaining the 
designation of rural areas concerned was not supported by GDP data either: excluding the Paris region, 
disparities in GDP per head at NUTS III in France were not particularly wide. Overall, a strict application of the 
Commission methodology would have led not only to the dedesignation of areas whose development the French 
authorities perceived to be an integral part of regional policy, but also the inclusion in the map of areas which 
they did not seek and which would have been out of line with national regional policy priorities. 
Source: D. Yuill et al (1992), European Regional Incentives 1992-3, Bowker-Saur, London. 
Ultimately this and similar map disputes with other countries were overtaken by wider regional policy 
events. Specifically, a major disagreement between DG Competition and DG Regional Policy erupted 
over the lack of coincidence between the Structural Fund areas and those eligible for domestic 
regional policy areas. This resulted in a number of short-term compromises being sought, but longer 
term further contributed to the unravelling of the 1988 Communication methodology.  
The roots of the third phase, which did not formally begin until the adoption of the 2000-06 Regional 
Aid Guidelines, lie in Commission regional aid map negotiations with Germany in 1991. The 
reunification of Germany presented a particular challenge for map negotiations since it coincided with 
both Commission pressure for a reassessment of the Zonenrandgebiet and the need for a domestic 
review to take account of the specific issues facing eastern Germany. Following reunification, the 
Commission was keen to dispense with the Article 92(2)(c) provisions which provided for a de jure 
exemption from the general ban on State aid in recognition of the regional impact of the division of 
Germany. In practice, the negotiations were much less contentious than anticipated, largely due to a 
flexible approach on the part of the Commission which, instead of imposing the 1988 Communication 
two-VWDJHDQDO\VLVIRUµF¶DUHDVRQWKH*HUPDQDXWKRULWLHV opted to set a population ceiling and allow 
more freedom in the selection of actual areas. This was certainly facilitated by the approach to area 
designation in Germany which is based on the so-called synthetic index ± a number of published 
indicators which are weighted and ranked - and which would have provided reassurance that a robust 
method underpinned the selection of areas. This decision formed the basis of an (undisclosed) 
methodology which was used for other Member States for the remainder of the 1990s ± including the 
imposition of a population ceiling on Austria when it joined the Community in 1995.  
This internal method was in turn the starting point for the negotiating a new approach to spatial 
coverage with the Member States, culminating in the 2000-6 Regional Aid Guidelines. The third phase 
of policy on spatial coverage has been characterised by three elements. First, overall population 
coverage and its distribution among Member StatesZKDWµIORRUV¶DQGµFHLOLQJV¶VKRXOGEHDSSOLHG
and what transitional arrangements should apply. Second, the parameters within which domestic 
                                                     
21
  Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on Competition Policy (Luxembourg 1991). 
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authorities can select assisted areas and propose maps to the Commission. These two elements 
are negotiated ex ante. The third element comprises the decisions approving the national assisted 
area maps, which themselves become an integral part of the regional aid guidelines. Since 2006, this 
has also formed the basis for the compatibility of regional aid under the block exemption regulations.  
Figure 10: Spatial coverage under the regional aid guidelines (post 2000) 
 
In essence, since the 1990s and the piloting of the population approach, the overall population ceiling 
has become a proxy for regional aid discipline and a reflection of the principle that regional aid should 
be exceptional and therefore cover less than 50 percent of the population. 
Over the long term, regional aid has had a significant impact on the coverage and shape of assisted 
areas maps in many countries. In addition, Commission intervention has eliminated the multiple 
assisted areas that existed in some countries,22 with support under such measures typically being 
reduced to de minimis levels or restricted to SMEs. In France, for example, a separate map operated 
for the local business tax concession (exonération de la taxe professionnelle), but Commission 
intervention realigned this map with that for the SULPHG¶DPpQDJHPHQWGXWHUULUWRLUH.  
In terms of spatial coverage, the principles of RAG 2007-13 and RAG 2014-20 do not differ markedly 
from RAG 2000-06. However, an important feature is the role of GDP(PPS) per head, coupled with 
WKH SRSXODWLRQ FHLOLQJ /HYHOV RI *'3336 SHU KHDG GHWHUPLQH µD¶ UHJLRQ FRYHUDJH DQG VSHFLDO
SURYLVLRQLVPDGHIRUDQ\UHJLRQ ORVLQJ µD¶VWDWXV LQWKHQHZSHULod. This has meant that successive 
enlargements to include less prosperous countries has reduced coverage in more prosperous 
countries in order to remain within the overall ceiling. Also significant for some countries are the 
provisions on population density. Importantly, however, these are absolute, rather than relative 
measures, with the result that the eligibility of sparsely-populated regions has been unaffected by 
enlargement.  
The general trend has been for assisted area coverage to come under pressure in the more 
prosperous older Member States ± thus in the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, coverage has 
fallen from around 27 percent to eight percent or less between 1980 and 2014. However, this pattern 
                                                     
22
 The exception to this is operating aid which is only compatible in the case of sparsely-populated and outermost 
regions so may operate on the basis of different geography.  
5$*GHWHUPLQHVRYHUDOOSRSXODWLRQFHLLQJµD¶UHJLRQV
DQGSUHGHWHUPLQHGµF¶DUHDV 
5$*VHWVµF¶FRYHUDJHDQGGHVLJQDWLRQSDUDPHWHUV 
Domestic authorities prepare and notify maps 
Approved maps become integral part of RAG 
Limited scope for review in RAG lifetime 
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has not been linear or even: coverage increased in 2014 in Belgium, France and Austria, reversing, or 
at least halting the longer term decline in coverage.  
Figure 11: Trends in Assisted Area Coverage (% of population) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2004 2007 2009 2014 2017 
BE 39.5 33.1 33.1 35.0 35.0 30.9 30.9 25.9 25.9 29.95 29.95 
FR 38.2 39.0 41.9 40.9 42.4 36.7 36.7 25.3 18.4 24.17 24.17 
DE 36.0 28.4 38.0 38.5 37.6 34.9 34.9 29.6 29.6 25.85 25.85 
IT 59.0 59.0 59.0 48.8 48.9 43.6 43.6 39.7 34.1 34.07 35.52 
LU 100.0 100.0 100.0 79.9 42.7 32.0 32.0 21.1 16.0 8.00 8.00 
NL 27.4 25.0 19.9 15.6 17.3 15.0 15.0 9.9 7.5 7.50 7.50 
DK 27.0 24.0 20.7 19.9 20.2 17.1 17.1 11.3 8.6 7.97 7.97 
IE 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 50.0 51.28 51.28 
UK 45.4 37.8 37.8 36.8 38.1 30.7 30.7 23.9 23.9 27.05 27.78 
GR 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
PT 
    100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.9 76.7 85.02 85.02 
ES 
    58.6 58.6 75.9 79.2 79.2 72.0 59.6 68.66 68.66 
AT 
      35.2 35.2 27.5 27.6 22.5 22.5 25.87 25.87 
FI 
      41.6 41.6 42.2 42.2 33.0 33.0 26.03 26.03 
SE 
      18.5 18.5 15.9 15.9 15.3 15.3 12.26 12.26 
CY 
            100.0 66.0 50.0 50.00 50.00 
CZ 
            100.0 96.3 88.6 88.10 88.10 
EE 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
HU 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 76.71 76.71 
LV 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
LT 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
MT 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
PL 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
SK 
            100.0 96.4 88.9 88.48 88.48 
SI 
            100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
BG 
              100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
RO 
              100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
HR 
                  100.00 100.00 
Source: EPRC research based on Yuill D et al (eds). European Regional Incentives, various editions and 
Commission regional aid guidelines.  
The population coverage driven approach, coupled with enlargement, has meant that assisted area 
coverage is affected by relative levels of prosperity. Enlargement since 2004 has lowered average 
OHYHOVRI*'3336H[FOXGLQJVRPHUHJLRQVIURPHOLJLELOLW\DVµD¶UHJLRQVWKURXJKWKHVWDWLVWLFDOHIIHFW
of enlargement, rather than absolute changes in prosperity. The impact of this is reflected in Figure 12 
which shows that, except for 2004-06, overall coverage has always been in the range 42 to 50 
percent. One of the aims of RAG 2000-6 was to manage EC15 spatial coverage downwards (hence 
the fall from 46.7 percent of the population in 1999, to 43.2 percent in 2000 after the revised maps 
were authorised). Enlargement in 2004 raised coverage to over 52 percent, but RAG 2007-13 
reduced coverage further in EC15 (and in some new Member States) to bring overall coverage below 
50 percent from 2007, and lower still in 2009 once transitional periods had expired.  
Looking at longer-term trends, it appears that, in spite of fraught regional aid policy relations between 
Member States and DG Competition, there was limited Commission success in containing spatial 
coverage until RAG 2000-6: between 1980 and 1999 coverage in the EC9 fell by less than four 
percentage points; by contrast, between 1999 and 2009, it fell by almost 15 percentage points.  
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Figure 12: Assisted area coverage and enlargement 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2004 2007 2009 2014 2017 
EC9 43.9  40.2  42.6  39.8  40.2  35.4  35.4  28.6  25.5  26.5  26.9  
EC10 
 
42.4 44.7 41.9 42.3 37.7 37.7 31.1 28.1 29.0 29.4 
EC12 
  
48.1 45.5 47.8 44.2 44.4 37.9 33.4 35.4 35.7 
EC15 
   
44.6 46.7 43.2 43.3 37.0 32.8 34.5 34.7 
EU25 
      
52.5 46.8 42.9 43.7 43.8 
EU27 
       
49.9 46.1 46.7 46.8 
EU28 
         
47.2 47.2 
NMS10/12/13 
     100.0 95.2 97.9 95.6 95.6 
Source: EPRC calculations based on Figure 11.  
As mentioned earlier, the provisions on low population density are important for some countries, most 
notably Sweden and Finland in the EU, and Norway and Iceland in the EEA.23 The population quotas 
IRUµF¶DUHDVDUHEDVHGRQWKHSRSXODWLRQRI1876UHJLRQVZLWKDSRSXODWLRQGHQVLW\RIOHVVWKDQ
inhabitants per km2 and NUTS 3 regions with a population density of less than 12.5 km2.  
Figure 13: Assisted area coverage in the EEA 
 1995/6 2000/1 2007 2008 2014 
NO 25 25.79 27.5  25.51 
IS 40.8 33.2 31.6 37.5 36.5 
Source: EFTA Surveillance Authority decisions.  
Because these are absolute criteria unaffected by enlargement, population coverage on the basis of 
population density has been sustained ± in Norway, for example, the coverage of the regional 
investment aid map has even increased slightly since EEA membership. In Iceland, RAG 2000-6 
resulted in a decrease in coverage, but a judicious redrawing of the NUTS boundaries applicable from 
2008 resulted in an increase in coverage. 
Downward pressure on assisted area coverage has also affected the appearance of the assisted area 
maps. In RAG 2000-6 the quid pro quo for the imposition of a population ceiling was, in principle, 
greater flexibility for Member States in the actual selection of areas. However, the Commission was 
anxious to avoid pin-SRLQWLQJRU µOHRSDUGVNLQ¶PDSVGHVLJQWRFLUFXPYHQW WKHFHiling by focusing on 
areas of economic activity without including significant residential population. In consequence, the 
selection of assisted areas must conform to certain parameters. These rules have been relaxed 
somewhat since RAG 2000-XQGHUZKLFK WKH&RPPLVVLRQVRXJKW WR LPSRVHDUDQNLQJRI µF¶DUHDV
and a strict cut-off once the population ceiling was reached. The fine-tuning involved in designing 
assisted area maps that maximise the available population quota is clearly evident in the current 
regional aid maps compared to their predecessors as the following maps from selected EC9 Member 
States show.  
                                                     
23
 Sweden, Norway, and Iceland rely entirely on population density to determine assisted area coverage; in 
Finland, a small proportion of µF¶DUHDVSHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQLVQRQ-predefined. 
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Figure 14: Assisted areas in France 1979 and 2014-20 
 
 
Sources: Yuill, D and Allen, K (1980) European Regional Incentives and CGET. 
Figure 15: Assisted areas in Germany 1979 and 2014-20 
 
 
Sources: Yuill and Allen op cit and Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. 
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Figure 16: Assisted areas in Italy 1980 and 2014-20 
 
 
Note: The 2014-PDSGRHVQRWVKRZWKHµXSJUDGLQJ¶RI Sardegna to µD¶UHJLRQVWDWXs ± see Annex I. 
Sources: Yuill and Allen, op cit and http://www.aiutidistato.org/project/carta-degli-aiuti-di-stato-regionali-italia/  
Figure 17: Assisted areas in the United Kingdom 1979 and 2014-20 
 
 
Note: The 2014-20 PDSGRHVQRWVKRZWKHµXSJUDGLQJ¶RI7HHV9DOOH\	'XUKDPWRµD¶VWDWXV± see Annex I. 
Sources: Yuill and Allen op cit, and BEIS.  
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5. FORMS OF AID 
x Commission perspectives on forms of aid are linked to two issues: first, the need to measure 
and compare different types of support ± a grant equivalent; second, the desire to 
HOLPLQDWHDLGWKDWµSURSVXS¶LQHIILFLHQWDFWLYLWLHV by supporting ongoing expenses. 
x This led to early action against so-called operating aids in a number of countries, 
especially on accession. 
x Opposition to operating aid contributed to demise of some major instruments of regional 
policy. 
x Progressive narrowing of forms of aid offered ± by late 1990s, main form of regional aid 
was capital grant in every Member State. 
x Operating aid allowed in two areas: outermost regions and sparsely-populated areas. 
x Development of policy tortuous ± sometimes leading to curtailment of major operating aid 
schemes, but also extension of operating aid with GBER. 
 
Commission action on forms of aid is closely-linked to considerations of transparency. The first 
principles considered that the requirement WKDW³DLGEHWUDQVSDUHQWFRQVWLWXWHVDQHVVHQWLDOFRQGLWLRQ
IRUWKHFRRUGLQDWLRQDQGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHV\VWHPVRIDLG´)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHSULQFLSOHVRIFR-
RUGLQDWLRQDLGZDV WUDQVSDUHQWRUPHDVXUDEOHZKHQ WKH µFRPPRQPHWKRGRIDVVHVVPHQW¶FRXOGEH
applied to it. 
The common method of assessment involved a number of conventions and assumptions which aimed 
to make aid comparable and measurable; it was based on relating the amount of aid to the amount of 
investment, expressed as a percentage of the aid after tax - net grant-equivalent (NGE). Implicit in 
this was that operating aid could not be transparent in these terms. Opposition to the use of operating 
aids, which was reinforced in successive versions of the regional aid principles in the 1970s, led the 
Commission increasingly to question the types of aid offered by the Member States. For example, in 
the Netherlands, investment premia which included scope to assist replacement investment were 
GHHPHGSHUPDQHQWO\WRUHGXFHILUPV¶UXQQLQJFRVWVDQGWKHUHIore discourage them from adapting to 
PDUNHWFRQGLWLRQVVXFKDLGFRXOGQRWLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZ³IDFLOLWDWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFHUWDLQ
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVRUFHUWDLQHFRQRPLFDUHDV´24  
Successive enlargements saw countries forced to change regional aid packages either in the course 
of accession negotiations or shortly after. Thus, major elements of the United Kingdom regional aid 
package were altered as a consequence of Commission intervention. The Regional Employment 
Premium (REP), for example:25 
³VHHmed to infringe almost every canon of compatibility in that it constituted a continuing 
subsidy to operating costs available to all firms in the assisted areas and was unconditional 
XSRQDQ\LQYHVWPHQWDFWLYLW\«´ 
                                                     
24
  Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 184. 
25
  0&0DF/HQQDQµ5HJLRQDO3ROLF\LQD(XURSHDQ)UDPHZRUN¶LQ'0DFOHQQDQDQG-53DUURegional 
Policy: Past Experience and New Directions (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979) p. 251. 
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The Commission did not insist on the REP beLQJZLWKGUDZQLPPHGLDWHO\EXWPDLQWDLQHG³SHULRGVRI
SUDJPDWLF VLOHQFH DQG IOH[LELOLW\´ WKH 5(3 ZDV HYHQWXDOO\ DEROLVKHG LQ  In the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, the Commission blocked the implementation or forced the amendment of 
significant regional operating aid schemes in several Member States. For example in Spain, 
legislation provided for a social security concession within the regional aid package, but the Spanish 
authorities were prevailed upon by the Commission not to implement the measure, this in exchange 
for concessions on the reference interest rate to be used in aid calculations. In Italy, Commission 
approval of a package of measures had been conditional on a given budget so that the refinancing of 
the measures required further Commission authorisation. In authorising this, the Commission took the 
opportunity to insist that a package of tax concessions should be converted into tax credits in order to 
relate their value to investment costs.26 This quite systematic and opportunist approach to dismantling 
major existing operating aid schemes contributed to a high degree of homogeneity in the principal 
regional incentives of the Member States; by the end of the 1990s, the main element of the regional 
aid package in almost every Member State was a capital grant.27 In the 2000s, the State aid 
compliance of the Special Economic Zones were a highly contentious issue in accession negotiations 
with Poland leading to a reduction in the timeframe for their implementation and the capping of values 
such that aid is not open-ended.28 
In the main, the Commission has exerted considerable pressure to contain or eliminate operating aid. 
The major exception to this trend has been the retention of operating aid in the Outermost 
Regions (OMRs) and low population density areas.  
The Commission first outlined the circumstances in which it might authorise operating aid in the 1988 
Communication and explicitly in relation WRµD¶UHJLRns. In the case of Portugal the Commission was 
able to accept, at least initially, the tax provisions for Madeira, which allowed for significant reductions 
in corporation tax, among other things. Over time, however, the corporation tax concession has come 
under intense scrutiny from the Commission, resulting in its value being reduced considerably and 
explicitly linked to job creation.  
Enlargement to include Finland and SwedenZKLFKGLGQRWKDYHµD¶UHJLRQVEXWGLGKDYHdistinctive 
regional disparities reflected in low population density, required a new approach. This was undertaken 
in an amendment to the 1988 Communication,29 which defined of low population density areas (NUTS 
3 areas with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per head) and provided scope for transport aid related to 
additional costs incurred within such areas. Under the EEA agreement, parallel provisions applied to 
Norway and Iceland, with ESA responsible for supervision. This led to difficult negotiations and all 
three Nordic countries being forced either to µreshape¶ social security concessions into transport aid, 
or to operate them on a de minimis basis only. Competition policy relations over the regionally-
differentiated social security concession (RDSCC) in Norway have been particularly convoluted and 
protracted ± see Figure 18. 
                                                     
26
 Commission Decision of 9 December 1992 on the refinancing of Law No 64 of 1 March 1986 on special aid to 
the Mezzogiorno, OJEC L117/22 of 13 May 1993. 
27
 D. Yuill et al (eds.), European Regional Incentives 1999. 
28
 .LVORZVND07KHIXWXUHRI6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQHVLQWKH$IWHUPDWKRI3RODQG¶V$FFHVVLRQWRWKH
European Union, Journal of International Business and Law, 5(1).  
29
 Commission notice concerning an amendment to Part II of the communication on the method for the 
application of Article 92(3)(a) and (c); OJEC C364 of 20 December 1994. 
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Figure 18: Regional aid control and the Norwegian RDSCC ± from outlawed to mainstream? 
Action Outcome Timing 
ESA review of NO 
RDSSC 
Begins review in 1995 and pURSRVHVµDSSURSULDWHPHDVXUHV¶WR12
to adapt RDSCC into transport aid scheme 
Dec 145/97/COL; 
May 1997 
NO letter Ministry of 
Finance 
NO refuses to comply Letter of 24 July 
1997 
ESA investigative 
procedure  
 Dec 246/97/COL; 
November 1997 
ESA conditional 
negative decision 
RDSCC is incompatible with Article 61(3) EEA Treaty unless 
adapted into transport aid scheme and sectoral restrictions applied 
Dec 165/98/COL; 
July 1998 
NO challenges ESA 
Decision before 
EFTA Court 
Suspension of application of ESA decision until Court ruling. NO 
contends that RDSSC is not State aid and that ESA has failed to 
take account of employment policy issues. 
 
EFTA Court ruling  EFTA Court finds in favour of ESA E-6/98; May 1999 
NO notifies 
amended RDSSC 
Specifies excluded sectors, including: hydropower production, 
mining of metal ores and certain minerals, gas and oil production, 
shipbuilding, steel, telecommunications, financial services, and 
freight transport by road  
September 1999 
ESA positive 
decision 
Approves RDSSC to end 2003 concluding that it can be accepted 
as indirect compensation for additional transport costs 
Dec 228/99/COL; 
September 1999 
RAG 2000-6 Retains definition of SPA as <12.5 inh. per km2; allows for 
transport aid in SPA 
Adopted March 
1998, applies 
January 2000 
COM negative 
decision on SE 
SSC 
COM concludes that Swedish SSC scheme is incompatible; puts 
ESA conclusion in doubt and prompts re-examination of NO RDSSC 
OJ L244/32; 
December 2000 
ESA proposes 
appropriate 
measures 
In light of COM decision on SE scheme, concludes that NO should 
take steps to render scheme compatible with Art 61(3) EEA by 1 
January 2004. 
Dec 172/02/COL, 
September 2002 
NO notifies RDSSC 
and transport aid 
Transition to Zone 1 rates in Zones 3 and 4 over 2003-07; new 
transport aid scheme in low population density areas 
March 2003 
ESA opens 
investigative 
procedure 
 Dec 141/03/COL, 
July 2003 
Common accord 
of EFTA States  
Decision that RDSCC in Zone 5 is compatible with EEA Treaty 
due to exceptional circumstances 
No 2/2003/SC, 
July 2003 
ESA positive 
decision 
Approves transitional arrangements to phase-out RDSSC for Zones 
2, 3 and 4 for 2004-07; no decision required on Zone 5 due to 
common accord of EFTA states 
Dec 218/03/COL, 
November 2003 
NO notifies change 
to RDSSC 
Proposes that certain sectors (not exposed to competition) should 
not be subject to transitional rates 
April 2004 
ESA opens 
investigative 
procedure 
 Dec 245/04/COL, 
October 2004 
ESA negative 
decision 
Rejects notification of April 2004, but ESA Decision of November 
2003 remains in force 
Dec 298/05/COL, 
November 2005 
RAG 2007-13 LPD areas defined as NUTS 2 <8 inh. per km2 or NUTS3 <12.5 inh. 
per km2; allows for operating aid other than transport aid in least 
populated regions (NUTS 2 <8 inh. per km2) 
Adopted April 
2006, applies from 
January 2007 
NO notifies revised 
RDSSC 
Lower assisted area coverage (17.7% rather than 23.4%) but SSC 
rates revert to pre-transition decision levels (i.e. 2003). 
June 2006 
ESA positive 
decision 
 Dec 228/06/COL, 
July 2006 
RAG 2014-20 LPD area definition retained, but greater burden of proof on 
need for operating aid. Sectoral restrictions exclude energy 
and transport from RAG. 
Adopted July 
2013; takes effect 
July 2014 
NO notifies revised 
RDSSC 
Higher assisted area coverage (19.7%), same SSC rates as 2014-
20. 
May 2014 
ESA positive 
decision 
Difficult negotiations over sectoral constraints (but ultimately 
imposed by ESA); also, major evaluation required given scale of 
budget 
Dec 225/14/COL, 
June 2014 
GBER 2014-20 
revised 
New provisions: remove energy and transport sectors from 
regional aid exclusion wrt to regional operating aid schemes 
(art. 13(a)); and add provision for operating aid in very 
sparsely-populated areas up to 20% of labour costs. 
Reg 2017/104 
amending GBER 
2014-20 (Reg 
651/2014) 
Source: EPRC research. 
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$WDOPRVW12.ELOOLRQ¼ELOOLRQDQQXDOO\WKH5'6&&LVFXUUHQWO\WKHVLQJOHODUJHVWUHJLRQDODLG
scheme in the EEA31 in budgetary terms and pre-dated Norwegian membership of the EEA. As an 
operating aid, it came under the immediate scrutiny of ESA in 1995, with successive attempts to 
SKDVHRXWWKHPHDVXUHRUµVKRH-KRUQ¶LWLQWRDWUDQVSRUWDLGVFKHPH+RZHYHUZKDWLVVWULNLQJLVWKH
extent to which competition policy has ultimately been reshaped around the RDSSC, rather than the 
other way around. The key steps in competition policy control of the RDSCC are summarised in 
Figure 18: changes to the various iterations of the regional aid guidelines (together with a common 
accord of the EFTA states that the northernmost zone faced exceptional circumstances), have 
progressively brought the treatment of regional operating aid for sparsely-populated areas into the 
PDLQVWUHDP,QDILQDO µWZLVW¶WKHUHYLVLRQVWRWKHGBER essentially bring the scheme within the 
ambit of the block exemption regulation (budgetary issues and the requirement for an evaluation plan 
notwithstanding). As a result, more than 22 years on and in spite of changes in the interim, the current 
RDSCC is largely indistinguishable from its 1995 predecessor. 
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6. AID INTENSITY 
x The linking of aid intensities to the severity of the regional problem has been a core 
component of regional aid control since the outset. 
x Initially, there was no direct calibration, the Commission took the prevailing rates in the 
Member States as a starting point. 
x Until the 2000s, Commission ceilings did not bite1*(ZDVW\SLFDOLQPDQ\µD¶UHJLRQV
but not necessarily affordable; generally, aid schemes became more discretionary and 
policymakers more value-conscious. 
x Since 2000 aid intensities have been lowered across the board both in nominal terms and 
by using gross grant equivalent in place of NGE. 
x This was partly motivated by competition concerns, as well as the affordability of high 
intensities for less prosperous countries.  
x $LGLQWHQVLWLHVDUHDVORZDV**(LQVRPHµF¶DUHDVUDLVLQJTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKH
µLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶of aid. 
 
The linking of aid intensities to the severity of the regional problem has been a part of regional aid 
discipline since the outset; curiously, very early proposals even suggested that there should be aid 
minima, as well as aid maxima in order to ensure a level playing field!30 This suggestion was, 
unsurprisingly, not carried through into the regional aid principles of 1971 and 1973, which instead 
tended to take the prevailing aid ceilings as the starting point for aid ceilings in the assisted areas, 
while setting a limit of 20 percent in the central regions.  
By 1979, the Commission had developed a more comprehensive matrix and complemented this with 
aid per job ceilings as an alternative. That said, the focus of attention in controlling regional aids was 
RQ WKHLU IRUPDQGVSDWLDO FRYHUDJH WKH SULQFLSOHV UHODWHG WRDLG LQWHQVLWLHV WHQGHGQRW WR µELWH¶ DQG
were consequently less controversial, largely owing to the very high levels authorised. 
Figure 19: Aid intensities under the 1979 principles 
Region Maximum capital intensity Aid per job ceilings 
Group 1: Ireland, Mezzogiorno, 
Northern Ireland, West Berlin, DOMs 
75 % NGE ¼ 
Group 2: Prime de développement 
régional zones (FR); other Italian 
designated areas; Industrial 
Development Act assisted areas 
(UK) 
30 % NGE  ¼VXEMHFWWRRYHUDOO
maximum of 40 % NGE 
Group 3: Zonenrandgebiet (DE); 
Special Development Area and 
islands (DK) 
25 % NGE ¼VXEMHFWWRRYHUDOO
maximum of 30 % NGE 
Group 4: other regions 20 % NGE ¼VXEMHFWWRRYHUDOO
maximum of 25 % NGE 
Source: Communication of the Commission on Regional Aid Systems, OJEC C31/9 of 3 February 1979. 
As discussed earlier, the 1988 &RPPXQLFDWLRQH[SOLFLWO\GLVWLQJXLVKHGµD¶UHJLRQVDQGµF¶DUHDVIRUWKH
first time. 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQVHWWKHPD[LPXPFHLOLQJIRUµD¶UHJLRQVDVSHUFHQWQHWJUDQW-
                                                     
30
 Commission of the European Communities (1969) A regional policy for the Community, OOPEC, Luxembourg. 
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equivalent, effectively the same as under the 1979 principles. However, it stressed that aid levels 
should be adjusted in line with the severity of the regional problem and stated that the Commission 
would use its discretionary power to require regionally-differentiated aid ceilings below the 75 per cent 
ceiling. The Communication did not provide any indication of how rates would be set.  
)RU WKH µF¶ DUHDV $QQH[ ,,, SURYLGHG D OLVWLQJ RI UHJLRQV DQG FRUUHVSRQGLQJ DZDUG UDWH PD[LPD
approved for regional aid under Article 87(3)(c) as at 1 October 1987. Curiously, given the emphasis 
on the common method of assessment and the need for comparability, award values were set in 
gross grant equivalent terms in some countries, but net in others, with maximum rates of award 
ranging from 7 percent NGE to 45 percent NGE (around 30 percent NGE was typical), with no real 
explanation of the basis for the rates set. Annex III explicitly excluded the Zonenrandgebiet and West 
Berlin, which were eligible for aid on the basis of (then) Article 92(2)(c), but would soon be the subject 
of a compromise with the Commission outside this specific provision. 
As in other aspects of regional aid control, the 2000-6 Regional Aid Guidelines aimed to bring some 
order to the setting of aid maxima (though actual rates were those proposed by Member States and 
approved by the Commission within these limits).  
Figure 20: Maximum rates of award by firm size under RAG 2000-06 
Assisted area type Large (% nge) Medium Small 
µD¶UHJLRQOMR) 65 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µD¶UHJLRQ*'3(&DYHUDJH 50 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µD¶UHJLRQ (OMR with GDP > 60% EC15 average) 50 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µD¶UHJLRQ*'3!(&DYHUDJH 40 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µF¶DUHD1RUWKHU,UHODQG 40 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µF¶DUHDORZSRSXODWLRQGHQVLW\ 30   
µF¶DUHDVWDQGDUG 20 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
µF¶DUHD*'3!(&DY	XQHPSOR\PHQW(&DY 10 +10% GGE +15% GGE 
Note: Supplements of 10 per cent and 15 per cent gross for SMEs generally applied on top of these ceilings. 
Source: Assembled from RAG 2000-06, point 4.8. 
Overall, the RAG 2000-06 rates involved a substantial reduction in the ceilings applicable compared 
ZLWK WKHSUHYLRXVVLWXDWLRQ W\SLFDOO\ LQDQ µD¶ UHJLRQUDWHVZRXOG IDOO IURPSHUFHQW1*( WR-50 
percent NGELQDµF¶DUHDWKHUHGXFWLRQZRXOGEHIURP-30 percent down to 10-20 percent NGE.  
Figure 21: Maximum rates of award by firm size under RAG 2007-13 (% GGE) 
Assisted area type Large Medium Small 
µD¶region < 45% EU25 GDP; OMR < 75% EU25 GDP 50 60 70 
µD¶UHJLRQ < 60% EU25 GDP 40 50 60 
µD¶UHJLRQ < 75% EU25 GDP; OMR > 75% EU25 GDP 30 40 50 
Statistical effect  30ĺ 20 ĺ 30 ĺ 40 
µF¶DUHDORZSRSXODWLRQGHQVLW\ 15 25 35b 
µF¶DUHD (standard) 15 25 35 
µF¶DUHD*'3!(&DY	XQHPSOR\PHQW(&5 av.) 10 20 30 
Source: Assembled from information in RAG 2007-13, paragraphs 44-48. 
RAG 2007-13 continued this trend, but the combined effects of enlargement from EU15 to EU25 on 
GDP thresholds and the shift from net to gross grant-equivalents complicate comparisons between 
the position under RAG 2000-06 and RAG 2007-13. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reduction is 
dramatic: the shift from NGE to GGE alone might typically be around a quarter (i.e. 20% GGE is 
roughly equivalent to 25% NGE). In addition, the absolute rates fall too - LQWKHFDVHRIµF¶DUHDV they 
fall from 20 percent NGE to 15 percent NGE 
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RAG 2014-20 further reduces aid intensities across the board, except for the very poorest regions and 
the sparsely-populated areas. 
Figure 22: Maximum rates of award by firm size under RAG 2014-20 (% GGE) 
Assisted area type Large Medium Small 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3(8DY 50 60 70 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 35 45 55 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3SHUKHDG(8DY 25 35 45 
µF¶DUHDV± H[µD¶UHJLRQVXQWLO 15 25 35 
µF¶DUHDV± sparsely populated/border 15 25 35 
µF¶DUHDV 10 20 30 
Note: Rates for OMRs are increase by up to 20 percent for those with GDP per head at or below 75 percent of 
the EU average and 10 SHUFHQWIRUWKHUHPDLQGHU,QµF¶DUHDVDW1876RUEHORZWKDWDUHDGMDFHQWWRµD¶DUHDV
the aid intensity may be increased so that the differential does not exceed 15 percentage points.  
Source: Assembled from information in RAG 2014-20, para 171-177. 
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7. LARGE FIRMS, LARGE INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND LARGE 
AMOUNTS OF AID 
x Commission was concerned from outset that large scale regional aid could have 
undesirable effects, but Member States resisted Commission attempts at case-by-case 
scrutiny. 
x Evolution of policy reflects tension between need for transparency and mechanism that 
captures aid with most serious effects, and resource implications of case-by-case 
scrutiny. 
x Initial approach sectoral ± textiles, synthetic, fibres, shipbuilding ± but different rules applied. 
x Motor vehicle framework 1997 subjected all regional aid over a given threshold to 
Commission scrutiny. 
x Commission ambition was for multisectoral approach to limit capital-intensive aid and 
balance benefits to regional development against competition effects. 
x First attempt ± 1998 multisectoral framework (MSF) ± did not perform as intended. 
x Breakthrough in 2002 MSF which imposed reduction formula on aid rate calculations and 
notification threshold for exceptionally large projects or awards; now integrated into 
Regional Aid Guidelines, with some changes to basis for Commission assessment.  
x Strong incentive to remain under notification threshold as increasingly likely that 
notification will trigger full investigative procedure. 
x For µF¶DUHDVODUJHLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWVDQGODUJHDZDUGVQRORQJHUYHU\UHOHYDQW since 
RAG 2014-20 mainly excludes aid to large firms except greenfield projects.  
 
From the first steps to control regional aid in the 1970s, the Commission expressed concern at the 
sectoral repercussions of aid and was keen to have a mechanism through which to assess large 
awards or those with potentially significant trade or competition effects. However, not only was such 
an approach resisted by Member States but it was also difficult to implement in practice. In 
consequence, an ad hoc and sector-specific approach was adopted for a number of industries 
considered to be overcapacity ± notably synthetic fibres, shipbuilding and later motor vehicles, but in 
the main regional aid was operated simply on the basis of assisted area maps and corresponding aid 
ceilings until the late 1990s+RZHYHU WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDPELWLRQZDVWRKDYHDPRUHKRrizontal or 
µPXOWLVHFWRUDO¶ DSSURDFK WR FRQWDLQLQJ large individual awards and to attenuate the impact of the 
differences between Member States in their budgetary capacity for regional aid.  
 
Source: European Commission (1990) Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment, COM(90)556. 
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Commission attempts to gain some control over large awards have been hard-fought, as reflected in 
Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Evolution of treatment of large regional aid awards 
Basis Requirement Analysis 
Regional aid principle of 1970s Member States to notify sectorally 
oriented measures for Com scrutiny 
No evidence that this was done, at 
least systematically. 
Code on aid to synthetic fibres 
1977, 1996 (OJEC C94; 30.3.1996) 
Any plan to offer aid to this sector 
to be individually notified in 
advance 
Focus on sectoral consequences 
only and largely excluded possibility 
of aid for this sector 
Framework on State aid to the 
motor vehicle industry 1997, OJEC 
C279; 15.9.1997) 
Individual notification of aid 
H[FHHGLQJ¼PRUWRLQYHVWPHQWV
H[FHHGLQJ¼P in the motor 
vehicle sector 
Imposed as an µDSSURSULDWH
measure¶. Com takes cost-benefit 
approach measuring costs in 
comparator plants to determine aid 
levels. 
Multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects, 
OJEC C107; 7.4.1998 (MSF1998) 
Does not apply to sectors where 
already specific rules 
Individual notification if: 
x either: total project costs 
H[FHHG¼PLOOLRQDLGOHYHO 
proposed > 50% of regional aid 
ceiling and > ¼SHUMRE 
x or: total aid > ¼PLOOLRQ 
Com formula quantifies competition 
HIIHFWVµVWUXFWXUDORYHUFDSDFLW\¶
and market share), capital intensity 
(to limit aid to highly capital 
intensive projects) and regional 
impacts (direct and indirect job 
creation) to determine what rate of 
award the Commission would 
authorise; alternatively, it could 
open the investigative procedure. 
Multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects, 
OJEC C70 19 March 2002 
(MSF2002) 
Applied to all sectors. Reduction 
IRUPXOD¶ applied to all regional aid 
schemes to lower aid ceilings: 
x LQYHVWPHQW¼P
of regional aid ceiling 
x investment 
!¼P¼PRI
regional aid ceiling 
x LQYHVWPHQW!¼RI
aid ceiling 
Notification if planned aid exceeds 
DPRXQW¼PLQYHVWPHQWFRXOG
qualify for under formula 
Notified projects ineligible for aid 
beyond threshold if RYHUµPDUNHW
VFUHHQV¶LH either:  
x beneficiary accounts for 
>25% of product sales;  
x or, capacity created is 
>5%, except in rapidly 
growing markets. 
If no market power or capacity 
concerns, reduction formula applies 
to whole investment. 
If doubts, Com obliged to open 
investigative procedure. 
RAG 2007-13, para 64-70 
incorporated MSF2002 largely 
unchanged; Criteria for an in-depth 
assessment of regional aid to large 
investment projects OJ 2009 
C223/3 (LIPS guidance) 
Reduction formula and notification 
threshold as for MSF2002, but note 
that award ceilings had been 
lowered by RAG 2007-13 
If SURMHFWRYHUµPDUNHWVFUHHQV¶LH
either:  
x beneficiary accounts for 
>25% of product sales;  
x or capacity created is 
>5%, except in rapidly 
growing markets, 
the aid can only be approved after 
investigative procedure and 
detailed analysis based on LIPS 
guidance. 
If no market power or capacity 
concerns, reduction formula applies 
to whole investment. 
If doubts, Com obliged to open 
investigative procedure. 
RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014-20 Reduction formula and notification 
thresholds as for RAG 2007-13, but 
note that award ceilings lower 
further AND eligibility of large firms 
LQµF¶DUHDVVHYHUHO\FXUWDLOHG. 
Market screens dropped (following 
Smurfit Kappa); all projects 
exceeding notification threshold 
VXEMHFWWRµFRPSDWLELOLW\
DVVHVVPHQW¶LQ5$*-20. 
 
Commission proposals floated in the early 1990s focused on reducing the capital intensity of State aid 
through cost-per-job approaches, but these proposals were not made public and failed to gain traction 
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with the Member States. Nevertheless, from the late 1990s, the Commission started to exercise 
greater control over aid to large firms and/or large amounts of aid, starting with the 1997 Motor 
Vehicle Framework (reflecting the widespread use of regional aid to influence the location or 
expansion of car and truck component manufacturing) and a more horizontal approach under the 
1998 Multisectoral Framework (MSF 1998).31 In broad terms, MSF 1998 provided that any proposal to 
offer aid over given thresholds (see Figure 23) had to be notified and approved prior to 
implementation. The Commission then quantified the competition effects and regional impacts to 
determine the rate of award (or, if in doubt, open the investigative procedure). 32 
In practice, MSF 1998 did not function as anticipated. The number of aid proposals notified was about 
half what had been expected (probably because policymakers offered awards just below the ceiling). 
In most cases that were notified, MSF1998 did not result in lower rates of award. This partly owed to 
national budgetary constraints and the emphasis on value-for-money, but also to the poor design of 
the formula.  
The Commission drew lessons from its experience with MSF 1998, notably the need for simplification, 
the reduction of the administrative burden and the need for more predictability.33 The result was a 
revised multisectoral framework adopted in 2002 (MSF2002). The core elements of this were 
subsequently incorporated into RAG 2007-13 and RAG 2014-20. In fact, as Figure 23 shows, the 
basic award reduction formula in RAG 2014-20 remains unchanged since MSF2002. However, the 
formula has become significantly more restrictive over time due to the reduction in rates of awards 
discussed earlier (see 6). For instance, in 2000-6 typical maximum rates were 40-50 percent NGE for 
µD¶ UHJLRQV DQG  SHUFHQW 1*( LQ µF¶ DUHDV %\ 4-20 these were 25- SHUFHQW **( LQ µD¶
regions; LQµF¶DUHDV5$*-20 virtually eliminated the possibility of supporting investments 
by large firms, but for eligible projects the prevailing rate is generally 10 percent GGE.  
Importantly, notified aid to large firms must be limited to the minimum necessary to induce the 
LQYHVWPHQW WR WDNH SODFH FDOFXODWHG RQ D µQHW H[WUD FRVW¶ EDVLV LQ RUGHU WR IXOILO WKH SURSRUWLRQDOLW\
criterion under the compatibility assessment. The rates illustrated in Figure 24 therefore act as a cap 
on the minimum necessary. 
                                                     
31
 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJ 1998 C107/7. 
32
 For more details on the operation of MSF 1998 see F. Wishlade (2008) The Control of Regional Aid to Large 
Investment Projects: Workable Compromise or Arbitrary Constraint? EStAL 7(3) and M. Merola (2010) Regional 
Aid: Recent Trends and Some Historical Background ± with special focus on large investment projects, EStAL 
9(3). 
33
 K. Junginger-'LWWHOµ(FRQRPLFDQGOHJDOSUREOHPVRIUHJLRQDODLGWRODUJHULQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWV¶The law 
and economics of European State aid control, European School of Management and Technology, Berlin, 8-9 
October 2007.  
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Figure 24: Adjusted aid intensities by maximum rate and eligible expenditure 
 
Note: The initial rates vary according to the maximum aid intensity for the region, then decline for eligible 
H[SHQGLWXUHVRYHU¼PLOOLRQZKHUHWKHSURSRVHGDLGDPRXQWLVKLJKHUWKDQWKDWIRUZKLFKD¼PLOOLRQHOLJLEOH
LQYHVWPHQWZRXOGTXDOLI\ ¼PLOOLRQ LQDSHUFHQWDUHD¼PLOOLRQ LQDSHUFHQWDUHDHWF WKHQDLG
must be notified. However, in any event the adjusted aid amount is a ceiling. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of RAG 2014-20, para 20(c).  
The changes introduced in 2014 reflect the shift in the theories of competitive harm prioritised by the 
Commission since the late 2000s. In the early years of regional aid control, policy was primarily 
motivated by concerns at competitive outbidding for mobile investment ± i.e. competition between 
regions and nations. The main emphasis was on seeking to define and contain the geographical 
areas in which regional aid could be available. It is worth recalling here that until the 1980s, many 
Member States provided support to large firms throughout their territories in the form of so-called 
µJHQHUDODLGV¶ZKLFK IURPWKHV WKH&RPPLVVLRQVRXJKW WRGLVFLSOLQH WKURXJK WKH LPSRVLWLRQRI
explicit regional aid maps. In this period, it could be argued that the control of regional aid was more 
concerned with where regional aid could be justified, rather than whether competition was distorted 
and how.  
MSF 1998 marked the beginning of a second phase, in which the impact of aid on competition 
between firms was explicitly addressed in the case of very large projects; part of the analysis 
considered the impact of aid on capacity in a given sector and was the first attempt to consider the 
effects on market structure and competition between rivals. The reforms introduced under MSF 2000 
and RAG 2007-13 in the treatment of large firms maintained the focus on market structure, with 
screens to identify cases most likely to raise issues of concern related to market power or sectoral 
capacity.  
The 2009 LIPS Guidance saw the emergence of a third phase, which gives primacy to issues of 
economic efficiency and the perceived incentive effect of aid. RAG 2014-20 confirms this trend, 
eliminating the market screens as the trigger for in-depth scrutiny, and, on the basis of a perceived 
lack of incentive effect, curtails the elLJLELOLW\RI ODUJH ILUPV IRUDLG LQ µF¶DUHDV ,QDGGLWLRQ WKH6$0
FRQFHUQV ZLWK WKH µHIILFLHQF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI SXEOLF VSHQGLQJ¶ DUH UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH *%(5
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requirement to notify high budget schemes and the scope to impose an external evaluation as a 
condition of scheme approval.34 
 
                                                     
34
 RAG 2014-20, para 142-44. 
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8. COHESION POLICY RELATIONS 
x In the early years competition policy control of regional aid was itself perceived as an 
instrument of Community regional policy. 
x The implementation of the ERDF in the 1970s was uncontroversial since it mainly cofinanced 
nationally selected projects. 
x The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds raised major issues, primarily relating to spatial 
coverage, requiring compromise between DGs for Competition and Regional policies. These 
tensions ultimately dissipated through the extension of Cohesion policy to all regions in 2007-
13. 
x Cohesion policy State aid relations are now affected by a range of issues that go beyond 
regional aid due to two major underlying trends.  
o First, the definition of State aid has expanded along with the concept of economic 
activities 
o Second, ESIF interventions now extend beyond basic infrastructure and grants to 
firms, which in the past either did not entail aid or could be accommodated within the 
regional aid rules. 
x State aid has an increasingly high profile in Cohesion policy due to: SAAP and SAM; 
GBER introduction and expansion; µXSJUDGLQJ¶RI6WDWHDLGFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ-20 CPR. 
x RAG 2014-µQRGV¶WR&RKHVLRQSROLF\EXWa number of issues outside regional aid per 
se have been or are problematic, including: definitional issues, financial instruments.  
x The implications of audit result in a risk-averse approach to State aid compliance, with 
borderline projects more likely to be funded from domestic sources alone.  
 
Since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, relations between European regional or Cohesion 
policy and competition policy control of State aid have often been strained. In the early years, the 
focus of tension was on the discrepancies in the spatial coverage of the Structural Funds compared 
to the national assisted areas. There were two main underlying reasons for the lack of coincidence. 
First, different indicators and time periods were used by DG Competition from those provided for in 
the Structural Funds Regulation. Second, Structural Funds area designation was essentially focused 
on Community DYHUDJHV ZKHUHDV '* &RPSHWLWLRQ¶V PHWKRG IRU µF¶ DUHDV ZKHUH PRVW RI WKH µQRn-
FRLQFLGHQFH¶DURVHWRRNDFFRXQWRIERWKQDWLRQDODQG&RPPXQLW\DYHUDJHV 
The emergence of two different sets of assisted area maps was of practical relevance for two 
reasons. First, the reformed Structural Funds placed special emphasis on the encouragement of 
productive investment for which State aids were a key policy instrument. Accordingly, it had been 
agreed that the Structural Funds could part-finance aid schemes implemented by the Member States 
under the Community Support Frameworks (CSF).35  
                                                     
35
  Community Support Frameworks were the outcome of the negotiation process following the submission of 
regional plans by the Member States to the Commission. These set out the broad parameters of what was 
agreed in terms of strategic priorities and financing and were implemented through Operational Programmes 
(OP). 
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Second, in line with the Framework Regulation,36 it was stressed that only aid notified and approved in 
advance in accordance with the State aid provisions of the Treaty (now Articles 107 and 108) could 
be considered for part-financing. Reflecting this provision, a standard clause was included in all the 
CSFs to the effect that all measures constituting aid should be identified in applications for 
Community assistance and that new aid proposals and changes to existing schemes should be 
notified in line with standard procedures. 
Figure 25: Incoherence and uncertainty in area designation ± the Abruzzi example 
The national assisted area status of the Italian region of Abruzzi, designated as Objective 1 for the period 1988-
1993 was due for review by DG Competition before the end of 1990, just a year into the five-year regional 
development plan agreed under the CSF. The outcome of the review was that Abruzzi should lose LWVµD¶UHJLRQ
status, the level of GDP per head being significantly above the eligibility threshold. This was scarcely surprising 
since GDP per head in Abruzzi was well above the formal threshold for Objective 1even in 1988. This caused 
obvious difficulties within the context of the regional development plans agreed. Only after protracted discussion 
was agreement reached between DG Competition and DG Regio on the treatment of Abruzzi. 
 
Figure 267KHµFRKHUHQFH¶RIDVVLVWHGDUHDFRYHUDJH-1992 
Type  % of population Structural Fund Assisted Areas 1989-92 
µD¶UHJLRQV 
 
20.6 
 
µF¶DUHDV 
 
24.2 
3. National 
assisted areas 44.8 
4. Objective 1  
 
21.5 
5. Objective 2 
  
16.3 
6. Objective 5b  
 
5.2 
7. Structural Fund 
areas 
43.0 
8. Common 
coverage 37.0 
9. National aid 
only 7.8 
10. Structural 
Funds only 6.0 
11. Combined 
(8+9+10) 50.8 
Source: Data kindly provided by DG Competition, European Commission; map by DG REGIO. 
Lengthy and rather arcane debates ensued over issues of coincidence, coherence and cohesion.37 
These were largely resolved through a compromise between the Commissioners for Competition and 
                                                     
36
 Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88. 
37
 See Wishlade, F (2003) Regional State aid and Competition Policy in the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, pp145-180.  
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Regional Policy for the remainder of 1989-93, but the relationship between the maps was a major 
issue in the negotiation of the 1994-99 Structural Fund Regulations, and led to a dilution of DG 
&RPSHWLWLRQ¶V UHYLHZs of national regional aid maps in the 1990s. As mentioned earlier, the dispute 
also contributed to the unravelling of the &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQµD¶UHJLRQVDQGµF¶DUHDV+RZHYHU
it was instrumental in determining the starting point for the EU-wide population ceiling post 2000; this 
was set at 42.7 percent of the population, which was judged to be the minimum necessary to enable 
Structural Fund assisted areas to be contained within national assisted areas, if Member States so 
desired. Debates over map coherence disappeared from the agenda thereafter since the 2007-13 
Structural Fund Regulations applied EU-wide.  
It is true that the 2014-20 Regional Aid GXLGHOLQHV DQG *%(5 µQRGGHG¶ DW WKH QHHG IRU JUHDWHU
coherence between State aid control and Cohesion, but the scope of the adaptations was rather 
limited and in practical terms mainly involved some modest changes to ease State aid compliance for 
European Territorial Cooperation programmes. More generally, Cohesion policy State aid relations 
have been affected by a broader range of issues and trends that go well beyond regional policy 
concerns. This owes to two major underlying trends. First, the notion of State aid has expanded. 
The liberalisation of certain sectors that were once purely the domain of the State has extended the 
range of activities that can be considered to be economic, and therefore subject to State aid control. 
Second, Cohesion policy intervention is increasingly diverse. The types of intervention financed by the 
Structural Funds now extend well beyond basic infrastructure and grant-based support to firms, which 
had been the mainstay of intervention in the early years, to include projects at the margins of market-
based or economic activity. In addition, '*&RPSHWLWLRQ¶VUHIRUPDJHQGD and new developments 
in Cohesion policy, while simplifying some elements, have made others more challenging.  
Figure 27: Current issues in Cohesion policy and State aid compliance 
 
The 2005 State aid action plan and its successor the 2014 State aid modernisation programme 
RYHUKDXOHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRGLVFLSOLQLQJ6WDWHDLGUHYLVLQJJXLGHOLQHVDFURVVDQXPEHU
 'Notion of State aid' Communication 
 But, fall-out from Leipzig-Halle 
Definition of State 
aid 
 Extends range of exempt aid 
 Shifts compliance responsibilities to MS 
 Transparency requirements onerous 
Expansion of 
GBER 
 State aid compliance issues more complex for FIs than grants 
 Differential treatment of shared management and EU level FIs  
Emphasis on 
financial 
instruments 
 No mention of 'State aid' in 1988 SF Regulation; CPR 2013 
mentions 40 times! 
 Ex ante conditionalities on State aid 
CPR 'upgrade' of 
State aid compliance 
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of areas and introducing new ones in policy areas not previously covered explicitly. The final element 
of the package involved addressing the definition of State aid,38 which some domestic policymakers 
had sought for a long time, in the hope that it would sharpen the scope of Article 107(1) and provide a 
practical tool for deciding whether a given measure fell within the scope of State aid. In practice, the 
notice did not alter the substance of policy ± which ultimately relies on rulings form the European 
Courts ± and is more a convenient restatement of extant case law in a single document than a policy 
toolkit. However, the fact that this runs to some 50 pages and broaches topics such as health care, 
education and research show how far the notion of State aid has come since the Spaak report, which 
stated explicitly that such activities would fall outside the scope of State aid (see Figure 1).39 
Issues around the definition of State aid had been thrown into sharper relief for some domestic 
policymakers by the 2012 Leipzig-Halle40 decision.41 Following Leipzig-Halle, so-FDOOHG µDQDO\tical 
JULGV¶ IRU WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH 6WDWH DLG LPSOLFDWLRQV RI GLIIHUHQW LQIUDVWUXFWXUHV ZHUH GHYHORSHG
though for several years they appeared only under the auspices of the COCOF and were not explicitly 
published by DG Comp.42 This led some, such as the Greek Managing Authority, retrospectively to 
reassess, and if necessary notify ESIF-cofinanced infrastructure projects. In this context, several port 
investments and gas pipeline projects which had not been considered to involve aid were notified and 
found to comprise aid, though this was deemed to be compatible aid.  
Definitional issues in State aid ESIF cofinanced projects are not limited to infrastructure ± some 
Managing Authorities cite projects with social objectives that have become ensnared by State aid 
considerations, reflecting the wide notion RIµXQGHUWDNLQJ¶([DPSOHVLQFOXGHVXSSRUWIRU\RXWKFHQWUHV
and elderly day care centres, charitable organisations selling second-hand goods and employing 
disabled people. The social objectives of these projects are clear; however, the extensive reach of the 
State aid definition has meant that active consideration has had to be given to whether or not aid is 
involved and, if so, whether it can be accommodated within either the GBER or de minimis 
provisions.43 
The ESIF cofinanced investment in the Messara museum is an interesting example of a case notified 
for legally certainty, though ultimately found not to involve State aid, albeit on somewhat surprising 
grounds. The Commission could arguably have concluded that the activities of the museum were not 
really capable of being commercial since the revenues would not cover the operating costs over a 15-
year period in an area of activity from which the private sector was excluded by law. However, this 
decision illustrates the reach of the concept of economic activity, and the fact that it is not always 
straightforward to anticipate what will fall within it. 
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 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, OJEU C262/1. 
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 This text was not carried through into Article 92 in its entirely, but it nevertheless makes clear that these areas 
would fall beyond the purview of the Commission for State aid purposes.  
40
 C-288/11 P, Freistaat Sachsen and others v European Commission (Leipzig Halle) 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&do
cid=131967&occ=first&dir=&cid=17784  
41
 Others concluded that the outcome was implicit in the earlier Aéroports de Paris case: T-128/98 Aéroports de 
Paris v European Commission: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998TJ0128:EN:HTML  
42
 These are now produced explicitly as a DG Competition document: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/state_aid_grids_2015_en.pdf  
43
 Wishlade, F and Michie, R (2009) 3DQGRUD¶V%R[DQGWKH'HOSKLF2UDFle: EU Cohesion policy and State aid 
compliance, IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2). 
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Figure 28: Example of economic activity ± Messara Archaeological Museum44 
The Greek authorities considered that the construction of a new archaeological museum in Crete was non-
economic because:  
a) the safeguarding and exhibition to the public of unique Greek archaeological monuments is provided 
exclusively by the State according to the constitution and no private bodies are allowed to offer such 
services;  
b) the main aim of the project was to protect antiquities and conservation and not to promote tourism or 
any other inherently commercial activity; and  
c) the museum is not expected to result in profits ± indeed the profitable exploitation of archaeological 
monuments is illegal under Greek law and any revenue would be channelled back into purely cultural 
purposes without benefiting any commercial activity. 
The Commission was of the view that the existence of an economic activity could not be ruled out since the 
museum would provide a service against remuneration. The exclusion of third parties from providing a certain 
service did not rule out the existence of an economic activity, nor did the absence of profit. However, the 
Commission concluded that, largely owing to the remote location, the project would not have an effect on intra-
EU trade. 
It was common ground that the provision of canteen services and construction works were economic activities, 
however, in both cases the contractors either had been or would be appointed on the basis of open, transparent, 
non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedures organised in line with EU Directive 2004/18/EC; there 
was no advantage accorded to the construction firm and as the museum had no effect on intra-EU trade, then nor 
could the canteen. 
 
A by-product of the wide definition of State aid is the extended use of de minimis and / or block 
exemption regulations. The Commission increasingly steers Managing Authorities towards these 
frameworks as a way of obviating the need for determining whether there is State aid present at all. 
This does provide some security from an audit perspective, however, not only does it blur the 
distinction between the existence of aid under Article 107(1) and the compatibility of aid under Article 
107, but compliance with de minimis and GBER is not negligible in terms of administration.  
The 2014 General Block Exemption Regulation covers a very wide range of policy areas and has 
been subject to numerous clarifications from the Commission in response to so-called FAQ. As 
mentioned earlier, it has become increasingly important in reducing the number of notifications made 
to the Commission and decreasing WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZRUNORDGRQµURXWLQH¶DLGVFKHPHVLQ
of new aid measures were reported under the GBER. Importantly, it shifts the burden of policing 
aid onto national authorities. This requires significant administrative capacity to monitor and report 
aid, especially in countries where numerous tiers of government and a range of agencies can 
potentially offer State aid. In addition, some Managing Authorities report difficulties in reconciling the 
simplified cost options provided for under the Common Provisions regulation (CPR) with the eligible 
expenditure requirements under the GBER; it remains unclear whether these concerns have been 
satisfactorily resolved in the revised GBER adopted in June 2017.45 
The recent emphasis on the use of financial instruments entails multilevel State aid compliance 
assessments to ensure that aid at the level of the investor, the beneficiary and the final recipient are 
all compatible with the Treaty (or that no aid is present). These assessments more complicated for 
financial instruments than for grants, and it is clear that many Managing Authorities lack the capacity 
needed to assess compliance. 
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 Commission Decision SA.36581 (2013/NN) ± Greece ± Construction of Archaelogical Museum Messara, 
Crete, 6 November 2013. 
45
 Commission Regulation (EI) 2017/1084 amending Regulation 751/2014, OJEU L156/1 of 20 June 2017. 
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Figure 29: Advisory support needs among Managing Authorities 
 
Source: Wishlade, F, Michie, R. Robertson, P and Vernon, P (forthcoming) Improving the take-up and 
effectiveness of financial instruments. 
A further issue regarding financial instruments concerns the differences in the State aid treatment of 
shared management and EU level instruments. In this context, some have promoted the SME 
Initiative (SMEI) DV D µK\EULG¶ RSWLRQ ZKLFK DYRLGV WKH 6WDWH DLG and procurement issues faced by 
tailor-made instruments and yet allows a degree of adaptation to specific conditions. However, it is 
premature to draw conclusions on the performance and satisfaction with SMEI as time is needed to 
understand to what extent SMEI meets regional requirements, and / or potentially undermines 
capacity building. 
The 2014-20 Structural Fund Regulations have reinforced compliance with the State aid rules. 
The 1988 Regulation referred more or less in passing to a need for the Structural Funds to comply 
with the competition rules and did not explicitly mention µState aid¶ at all; 25 years on, the CPR 
PHQWLRQVµSWDWHDLG¶ 40 times.  
Under the ESI Funds Managing Authorities are responsible for the compliance of OP spend with the 
State aid rules ± though ultimately a complaint would involve the Member State. Audit authorities 
undertake checks and report to the Commission. In almost all countries there also are national State 
aid units. These can be consulted in cases of doubt about the existence of aid or its compatibility. 
Their authority varies ± some have a mandatory role and can prevent a transaction going ahead; 
others have an advisory role and need not be consulted in all cases and cannot prevent an ill-advised 
transaction from going forward. 
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It can be said that for Cohesion policy there is a relatively structured system for ensuring the 
compliance of ESI Fund spend with the State aid rules; this does not necessarily exist for domestic 
economic development policies, especially at the subnational level. Nevertheless, the European Court 
of Auditors reports suggest that State aid issues are the third most significant type of error (after 
procurement and eligible costs).  
Figure 30: ECA State aid checks on ESIF cofinanced projects in 2010-2014 
 1573 projects 
 269 (17%) State aid relevant 
 50 (19%) contained State aid errors: 
¾ Aid intensity too high (11 cases) 
¾ Absence of incentive effect (7 cases) 
¾ Undetected State aid or no notification (18 cases) 
¾ Monitoring or formal requirements not met (14 cases) 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2016) More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance 
with State aid rules in Cohesion policy, Special report 24/2016. 
A key innovation in the CPR is the introduction of so-called ex ante conditionalities in relation to 
State aid, requiring: 
x Arrangements for the effective application of EU State aid rules 
x Training and dissemination of information for staff involved in the implementation of ESI 
Funds 
x Arrangements to ensure administrative capacity. 
Action plans to achieve these objective were required in five Member States,46 though it is interesting 
to note the Court of Auditors observation that the highest State aid error rates were not necessarily 
among the Member States that did not meet the ex ante conditionalities. 
Even among countries that have not been required to adopt State aid action plans, there are signs 
that State aid discipline is being increased in ESI fund implementation. There is a heightened 
awareness among Managing Authorities of the need to identify when operations involve State aid. 
Examples of the approaches and steps taken include: 
x Assessment of State aid implications from the outset ± ie. µFDOOIRUSURMHFWV¶VWDJH or earlier. 
x Self-declaration of State aid relevance. For example, in Poland and in England, ERDF 
applicants must specify the State aid implications of their bid when they apply for funds. If 
they consider that no aid is involved, they must explain why; if State aid is involved, they must 
specify on what basis ± for example, de minimis or GBER ± they consider that support can be 
allowed.  
x Increased role for State aid units. These are sometimes existing national units that play a 
wider role in State aid discipline, as in England, or newly established units responsible for 
State aid compliance in all OPs, as in Greece. However, some are dedicated units within the 
Managing Authority which must approve the approach taken to State aid compliance. 
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 Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Romania, Slovakia.  
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x Use of checklists drafted by State aid units to give Managing Authorities greater certainty in 
assessing whether or not there is State aid. 
x Audit trails. Emphasis on explicitly recording the State aid assessment of all proposed 
operations and providing the justification for the view that there is no aid, or, if there is, on 
what basis it is compatible. 
x Last, many national State aid units have provided State aid training programmes for 
Managing Authority staff, as well as providing advisory services on an ad hoc basis  
In sum, there is evidence of an upgrading of the importance of achieving State aid discipline 
under the ESI Fund programmes. However, it also seems that ESI Funds Managing Authorities have 
become increasingly risk-averse in dealing with State aid issues. The systems have been tightened 
up and audit authorities can check the compliance of any transaction; lax procedures and failure to 
understand the State aid rules can lead to suspension of payments or delays, and the risk of losing 
funds. As a result, there is therefore a strong incentive to ensure the State aid compliance of ESI 
funds. 
This, in turn, means that transactions which are potentially problematic are more likely to be funded 
through domestic finance. Outside the Managing Authorities, the State aid rules are typically less well 
understood, especially at the subnational level. Also, while there is an obligation to comply with EU 
law and the State aid rules, there is not necessarily a systematic mechanism for checking the State 
aid implications of every transaction. As a result, the presence of State aid may well emerge from 
complaints from citizens or competitors, or media reports, as has happened in several of the high 
profile sports stadia cases.  
Nevertheless, there has been a growing emphasis on disseminating information on the State aid 
rules, and on the provision of advice ± for example in Italy, Poland and Scotland the State aid units 
have become more proactive in providing training courses, developing internet based information, 
newsletters, etc.  
At the same time, some are concerned that the approach to State aid should not become so risk 
averse that it jeopardises economic development policies. In the UK, and more recently in Germany, 
WKHUH LVH[SOLFLW UHIHUHQFH WRD³ULVNEDVHG´DSSURDFK WR6WDWHDLG ,QGHFLGLQJZKHWKHU WR WDNHD µQR
DLG¶ DSSURDFK RU WR VHHN WKH OHJDO FHrtainty provided by notification and approval this involves the 
following: 
x first, assessing the strength of the argument that the measure is not State aid;  
x second, evaluating the likelihood of legal challenge or of the Commission discovering the 
measure (if the SWDWHDLGµYHUGLFW¶LVXQFOHDU 
x third, analysing the consequences of such a decision and how difficult they would be to 
remedy (for instance the impact on firms of having to repay funds, or the damage to political 
credibility).  
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A checklist of questions to consider is included in the UK State aid guidance.47 It is important to stress 
that this approach is not about the risk of disregarding the rules, but rather about taking an informed 
approach to their interpretation and the possibility that the Commission view might differ. 
Where there is aid, compliance with the GBER is clearly the preferred option for domestic policy as it 
is for ESI Funds. That said, most consider the document difficult to navigate and some requirements 
onerous. Also, the sense persists that some forms of intervention that were not previously considered 
to be State aid at all, are now brought within the scope of the GBER, with all that this entails in terms 
of monitoring and reporting.  
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 Annex E ± A risk-based approach to State aid in BIS (2015) The State Aid Manual, BIS/15/148: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607691/bis-15-148-state-aid-
manual-update.pdf  
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9. EFFECTIVENESS AND EVALUATION 
x Competition policy concerns with the effectiveness of State aid are comparatively new. 
x Can be traced back to SAAP emphasis on economic analysis and SAM concerns with 
efficiency of public spending. 
x RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014 enable Commission to authorise and limit validity of large aid 
schemes conditional on outcomes of evaluation. 
x Several major aid schemes undergoing evaluation; results and impact on compatibility 
unknown. 
 
Competition policy concerns with the effectiveness of State aid are comparatively new. The 2005-9 
SAAP was set in the context of the Lisbon agenda and critical of the lack of economic analysis in 
State aid cases³PRVWRIWKHDQDO\VLVLQWKHSUDFWLFHRI(XURSHDQVWDWHDLGFRQWUROLVQRWILUPO\URRWHG
in economic SULQFLSOHV´.48 In response, policy shifted towards a more explicit balancing of the 
competition effects and wider benefits, reflected in the 2009 LIPS Guidance,49 on the criteria it would 
take into account in making the in-depth assessment of very large investment projects. This deals 
with the positive effects of aid, including a consideration of the objectives of aid, the appropriateness 
of the aid instrument, the incentive effect and proportionality, and considers the negative effects, 
including the crowding-out of private investment and the effects on trade EHIRUH µEDODQFLQJ¶ WKHVH
elements. In Dell Poland, the Commission applied this guidance for the first time.50 
SAM51 provided for a re-focusing of State aid control against the backdrop of Europe 2020, as well as 
the effects of the economic and financial crisis. What is noteworthy in SAM is the perception that 
³6WDWHDLGFRQWURO LVFUXFLDO LQRUGHU WR LPSURYH WKHHIILFLHQF\DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRISXEOLFVSHQGLQJ´
this is accompanied by an emphasis on the identification and targeting of market failure and the 
SURPRWLRQRIPHDVXUHVZLWKµLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶. 
Against this background, among the new developments in both RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014-20 is 
the scope for the Commission to make aid authorisation conditional on its approval of an evaluation 
plan. RAG 2014-20 provides the possibility for the Commission to limit the validity of aid schemes to 
four years in order for an evaluation to be carried out.52 The precise terms of any requirement to 
undertake an evaluation53 are defined in the approval of the aid measure. However, evaluations must 
by undertaken by experts independent from granting authorities, on the basis of a common 
methodology (which the Commission may provide) and must be made public. The circumstances in 
which an evaluation would be imposed as a condition of approval are limited to those with large 
budgets, schemes with novel characteristics or in areas where significant market, technological or 
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 H. Friederiszick, L-H Röller and V. Verouden (2008) European State Aid Control: An Economic Framework, in 
P. Buccirossi (ed.) Handbook of Anti-Trust Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
49
 Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to 
large investment projects OJ 2009 C223/3. 
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 Decision 2010/54/EC Dell Poland OJ 2010 L29/8. 
51
 European Commission (2012) EU State aid modernisation ± SAM, COM(2012) 209 final, 8 May. 
52
 RAG 2014-20, para 27. 
53
 See also: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/evaluation_issues_paper_en.pdf 
State aid control of regional development policy at 60 
EPRP Paper No. 103  43 European Policies Research Centre 
regulatory changes are envisaged. Evaluations must be carried out in sufficient time for the results to 
feed in to the Commission decision on any extension of the scheme proposed, or at expiry.54  
GBER 2014-20 provides for the expiry of GBER cover after six months for schemes with annual 
EXGJHWV H[FHHGLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ pending the approval by the Commission of an appropriate 
evaluation plan. In effect, this means that unless a Member State is able to provide an evaluation plan 
that is acceptable to the Commission, then GBER cover would be withdrawn and the scheme in 
question would need to be notified. As the whole scheme would then be subject to appraisal under 
RAG 2014-20, with the delays inherent in the notification process, there is a strong incentive for 
domestic policymakers to reach early agreement with the Commission on the evaluation plan. 
GBER 2014-20 sets out the minimum requirements for an evaluation plan;55 this should set out: 
x the objectives of the aid scheme 
x evaluation questions 
x result indicators 
x the methodology envisaged 
x data collection requirements 
x proposed timing, including the date of submission of the final report 
x description of the independent body conducting the evaluation or the criteria to be used for 
selecting the evaluator 
x mechanisms for publicising the evaluation. 
A provisional supplementary information sheet for the submission of an evaluation plan is available. 
Its use is not yet mandatory as this requires changes to the Implementing Regulation. However, its 
use is recommended and it refers Member States to a staff working document on a common 
methodology for evaluation.56 A version of this document had been subject to consultation at the end 
of 2013, and many Member States expressed concern at the ambition of the proposal and, more 
fundamentally, at the competence of the Commission to require evaluations of the effectiveness of 
measures financed with purely domestic resources.  
The approval of the social security concession in Norway by ESA57 provides for quite an exhaustive 
evaluation designed to assess the impact of the scheme on job opportunities and employment in the 
eligible regions, using results indicators that measure the impact which lowering employment costs 
through the scheme has on a range of factors including labour market participation rates and 
employment growth in the public and private sector. In addition, the evaluation is to assess the impact 
of the scheme on competition and trade, including issues related to size of undertaking and 
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 RAG 2014-20, para 144. 
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 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(14). 
56
 Commission Staff Working Document "Common methodology for State aid evaluation, 28 May 2014, 
SWD(2014) 179 final 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/state_aid_evaluation_methodology_en.pdf  
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 EFTA Surveillance authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
2014-20 (Norway), Dec no: 225/14/COL: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-
_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf  
State aid control of regional development policy at 60 
EPRP Paper No. 103  44 European Policies Research Centre 
international competition. A detailed timeline for the evaluation, as well as the participation of ESA in a 
methodological workshop, was also provided for with the delivery of the evaluation to ESA envisaged 
by end 2018. Domestically, the process began with a feasibility study which was the subject of a wider 
consultation.58 This led to the appointment of the successful tenderer late in 2015.  
Figure 31: Evaluation plans under RAG and GBER 
Country Scheme Basis Annual budget Reference 
Norway Regionally-differentiated 
social security contribution 
(RDSSC)  
RAG ¼404 million (NOK 13 billion) Dec no: 
225/14/COL 
United 
Kingdom 
Regional Growth Fund (RGF) GBER ¼PLOOLRQELOOLRQ± 
rounds 5 and 6, not all of which 
is State aid) 
SA.39273 
Germany GA support for productive 
investment 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQ SA.39460 
Poland Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQ3/1ELOOLRQ SA.40523, 
SA.38830  
Poland Competitiveness of SMEs 
under Regional Programme 
2014-20 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQ SA. 43142 
Portugal Inovação Empresarial GBER ¼PLOOLRQ SA.42136 
Italy Tax credit for productive 
investment 
GBER ¼PLOOLRQ SA.45184 
 
Elsewhere, evaluation plans were reported on the basis of the GBER rather than the RAG (which was 
adopted earlier). In other words, the evaluation requirement was triggered by the budget of the 
scheme rather than through the notification process under RAG 2014-20.  
At the time of writing, none of the evaluations are complete so the impact of the results cannot be 
known, but it would mark a new departure in State aid control if regional aid schemes were disallowed 
on the basis of evaluation outcomes. 
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 Evaluation of the Regionally Differentiated Social Security Contribution scheme in Norway ± a feasibility study: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/576280dd6b8f5b9b197512ef/t/57c6b2222994ca88ec544609/1472639524
524/R16-2015+RDSSC+scheme+feasability+study.pdf  
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10. REGIONAL AID GUIDELINES POST-2020? 
x Consideration of post-2020 State aid reforms seems to be at an early stage; there is no 
µKLJKOHYHO¶6WDWHDLGDJHQGD like SAAP or SAM. 
x Commission is taking soundings about the future of RAG and GBER, but no concrete 
outputs yet. 
x Reapplication of the RAG 2014-20 eligibility criteria suggests some FKDQJHVWRµD¶UHJLRQV, 
some induced by Brexit. 
x Can same / similar method be used IRUµF¶FRYHUDJHDVLQWKHSDVW? 
x Outcomes may be affected by further recent NUTS changes. 
 
Consideration of the future of the Regional Aid Guidelines and the General Block Exemption 
Regulation seems to be at an early stage. The Commission is taking soundings from Member States, 
but there are no concrete outputs from this process yet. In some countries, thought is being given to 
how the Regional Aid Guidelines might change. In Germany, for example, a major reform of regional 
policy has been agreed by the Federal government,59 and a commissioned study has indicated some 
changes to the Regional Aid Guidelines that would facilitate German regional policy in the context of 
(anticipated) lower population coverage. These include an increase in the overall population ceiling 
and more consideration of domestic disparities and at a finer level of geography than at present in 
order to reflect local conditions. In Norway, by contrast, the authorities are content with the present 
framework, reflecting the inclusion of the RDSSC in the RAG / GBER, and the relative stability of the 
approach to sparsely-populated areas which allows for Norwegian regional policy issues to be 
accommodated.  
In looking forward, there are a large number of variables that could affect spatial coverage of future 
maps, as well as other dimensions of regional aid control. 
Regarding spatial coverage, the starting point concerns which of the parameters are potentially open 
for adjustment, assuming the overall scheme of the RAG remains substantially unchanged, which 
itself remains unclear. Key questions include: 
x What would be the overall initial population coverage? 
x :RXOG WKH µD¶ WKUHVKROG UHPDLQ XQFKDQJHG DGMXVWHG IRU %UH[LW LH 1876  UHJLRQV ZLWK
GDP(PPS) per head less than 75 percent of the EU27 (ex UK) average? 
x :RXOGDQ\DGMXVWPHQWEHPDGHLIUHTXLUHGIRUµD¶UHJLRQVORVLQJWKDWVWDWXVGXHWR%UHxit? 
x :RXOGWKHVDPHV\VWHPRIµSUHGHILQHG¶DQGQRQ-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDVEHDSSOLHG" 
x How would the non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHa population be divided between countries? 
x :KDWµIORRUV¶µFHLOLQJV¶DQGWUDQVLWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVPLJKWDSSO\" 
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 German federal government (2017) Fortschrittsbericht der Bundesregierung zur Weiterentwicklung eines 
gesamtdeutschen Fördersystems für strukturschwache Regionen ab 2020, Berlin, September 2017 
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Figure 32: Key spatial coverage parameters 
 2014-20 Post-2020? 
Initial population coverage 46.53% EU27 (ex HR) % population EU27 (ex UK) ? 
GDP data 1876µD¶DUHDV 2008-2010 (initial) 
2012²2014 (mid-term review) 
2015-2017 (initial) 
GDP data NUTS 3 µF¶DUHDV 2008-10 2015-17 
Unemployment data at NUTS 3 
µF¶DUHDV 
2010-12 [partial] No longer published at NUTS 3 ± 
use NUTS 2? 2017-19 
µD¶UHJLRQWKUHVKROG GDP(PPS) per head <75% EU27 
(ex HR) average (+OMR) 
GDP(PPS) per head <75% EU27 
(ex UK) average? (+OMR) 
3UHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV± IRUPHUµD¶
regions 
$UHDVORVLQJµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXV $UHDVORVLQJµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXVDOVR
DUHDVORVLQJµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXVGXHWR
µ%UH[LWHIIHFW¶" 
3UHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV± sparsely-
populated regions 
NUTS 2< 8 inh per km2 
NUTS 3 <12.5 inh per km2 
NUTS 2< 8 inh per km2 
NUTS 3 <12.5 inh per km2 
 
Against this background, it is difficult to speculate about what approaches might be taken and their 
impact. Moreover, in a number of countries ± notably Latvia, Ireland and Poland 2016 NUTS 
boundary changes also seem set to have an impact on eligibility.  
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, Figure 33 LQGLFDWHV ZKDW D µUROOLQJ IRUZDUG¶ RI WKH FXUUHQW
approach might imply. This uses 2015 data (likely the first year of the three-year average to be used) 
and excludes the United Kingdom from the calculations ± i.e. the average is EU27 (EU28-UK) ± and 
the geography is NUTS 2013.  
There are several points to note from this: 
x Molise and Sardegna in Italy and several regions in Greece DQG 6SDLQ ZRXOG µUHJDLQ¶ µD¶
region status, having ceased to qualify in 2007 ± though most were reclassified at the 
2016/17 mid-term review (see Annex I). 
x Strední Cechy, Jihozápad and Jihovýchod (CZ), Dolnoslaskie (PL) and the Sofia region in 
Bulgaria (Yugozapaden) ZRXOG FHDVH WR TXDOLW\ DV µD¶ UHJLRQV KDYLQJ RXWJURZQ WKH µD¶
region threshold 
x Lithuania, Estonia, Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU) Wielkopolskie (PL) would ORVHµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXVDV 
a consequence of Brexit, owing to the fact that, for 2015, UK GDP(PPS) per head is above 
the EU average, so removing the UK from the data has a statistical effect on the threshold. 
(Were the United Kingdom to remain, and data be calculated on the basis of EU28, Tees 
9DOOH\	'XUKDPDQG6RXWK<RUNVKLUHZRXOGTXDOLI\DVµD¶UHJLRQVLQDGGLWLRQWR:HVW:DOHV
& the Valleys and Cornwall & the Scillies, as now).  
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Figure 33µD¶UHJLRQVSRVWDQGSRVW%UH[LW" 
Source: EPRC calculations from Eurostat data.  
Several other dimensions of regional aid control are explicitly or implicitly linked to decisions on 
spatial coverage. For example, if controls over the eligibility of ODUJHILUPVIRUUHJLRQDODLGLQµF¶DUHDV
remain tight, then there may be scope to relax aspects of the designation criteria IRU µF¶ areas. 
However, it remains to be seen whether reforming the Regional Aid Guidelines has essentially 
reached its limits: successive communications and guidelines have dramatically reduced assisted 
area coverage in many countries, instigating a recasting of the assisted area maps; aid intensities 
have been reduced by as much as two-thirds; support for large firms has been largely eliminated in 
WKHµF¶UHJLRQV; and the continued approval of schemes with large budgets has been made conditional 
on the outcome of evaluations of their effects and effectiveness. What now remains for the 
Commission to address save fine-tuning? 
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11. CONCLUDING ISSUES 
This paper has taken a long-term perspective on the evolution of State aid control over regional 
development in recognition of a policy 60 years in the making. 
Over time, every dimension of regional aid policy has come under scrutiny and often been subject to 
change. The focus of the paper has been on the changes brought about by competition policy, but it is 
certainly the case that, in some areas, the Commission was pushing against an open door: few, if 
any, countries now would contemplate large scale regional aid grants that automatically subsidised 
any new investment by any size of firm located in designated areas. Related, the reduction in aid 
intensities across the board has arguably been successfully in containing subsidy races for mobile 
projects in a way that more informal arrangements in other jurisdictions (such as the US) have been 
unable to achieve. 
This paper has suggested that, for the most part, domestic regional aid relations and the RAG are 
settled: there is scope for tinkering with eligibility ± especially for transitional areas ± and for easing 
WKHDUHDGHVLJQDWLRQFULWHULDIRUµF¶DUHDVIXUWKHUHVSHFLDOO\DVVXSSRUWIRUODUJHILUPVLQWKHVHDUHDVLV
largely eliminated so that the only effect is to change maximum aid intensities for SMEs.  
This paper has also argued that State aid relations with Cohesion policy have become more complex 
because of the combined effects of the expanding concept of State aid and the increasing diversity of 
Cohesion policy interventions. These tensions are exacerbated by the role of audit, which creates a 
WHQGHQF\ WR µIXGJH¶ GHFLVLRQV DERXW ZKHWKHU WUDQVDFWLRQV LQYROYH DLG DQG EOXU WKHP ZLWK LVVXHV RI
compatibility. At the same time, the GBER does not readily accommodate all Cohesion policy needs, 
and, specifically, the treatment of financial instruments currently discriminates against FIs under 
shared management in comparison with EU level instruments. 
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ANNEX I: REGIONAL AID MAP CHANGES ± MID-TERM REVIEW 
The 2014-20 Regional Aid Guidelines make provision for a limited review of assisted area coverage in 
2016.60 In June 2016, the Commission issued a Communication indicating the scope for changes to 
assisted areas with effect from 1 January 2017.61 The Communication mainly concerned Article 
107(3)(DUHJLRQVµDUHJLRQV¶DQGUDWHVRIDZDUGEXWDOVRFRQILUPHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\WRDPHQG$UWLFOH
FDUHDVµFDUHDV¶,QDOOFDVHV0HPEHU6WDWHVZLVKLQJWRDPHQGWKHLUPDSVKDGWRQRWLI\WKH
proposed changes to the Commission by 1 September 2016.  
Table A: 1876UHJLRQVHOLJLEOHIRUµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXVIURP-DQXDU\ 
Member State Region GDP(PPS) per head 2008-
2010 EU27=100 
GDP(PPS) per head 2012-
2014 EU27=100 
Greece Dytiki Makedonia 83.67 69.00 
 Ionia Nisia 82.67 66.67 
 Sterea Ellada 83.33 64.67 
 Kriti 83.33 62.00 
Spain Castilla-La-Mancha 82.33 72.67 
 Andalucía 78.00 68.00 
 Murcia 85.67 74.67 
 Melilla 83.67 68.67 
Italy Sardegna 79.00 74.00 
United Kingdom Tees Valley and Durham 77.33 73.67 
Source: European Commission Communication (see footnote 61).  
The regions listed in Table A FRXOGEHSURSRVHGIRUµD¶UHJLRQHOLJLELOLW\ZLWKDPD[LPXPUDWHRIDZDUG
of 25 percent of eligible expenditure. Of key importance, the change in status also enables more 
flexibility in aid to large firms, since VXSSRUWIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVLVHVVHQWLDOO\OLPLWHGWRJUHHQ-
field investments. All four countries mentioned in Table A WRRNXSWKHRSWLRQWRµUHJUDGH¶WKHUHJLRQV
FRQFHUQHGWRµD¶VWDWXV62 
In addition, in Greece and Portugal DGHFOLQHLQ*'3SHUKHDGLQUHJLRQVZKLFKDOUHDG\KDGµD¶VWDWXV
meant that higher rates of award could be applied (see Table B). In both case the national authorities 
took up this option.63  
                                                     
60
 Para 183-5, Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014->KHUHDIWHUµ5$*-¶@2-(8&RI-XO\
2013. 
61
 Communication for the Commission amending Annex I to the Guidelines on regional aid for 2014-20, OJEU 
C231/1 of 25 June 2016.  
62
 State aid cases: SA.46320 ± Greece; SA. 46099 ± Spain; SA.46199 ± Italy; and SA.46361 ± United Kingdom. 
63
 State aid cases: SA.46320 ± Greece; and SA.46356 ± Portugal.  
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Table B: Changes in aid intensity 2017-20 
Member 
State 
Region GDP(PPS) per head 
2008-2010 EU27=100 
GDP(PPS) per head 
2012-2014 EU27=100 
Aid intensity 
2017-20 (%) 
Greece Anatoliki 
Makedonia, Thraki 
68.00 51.67 35 
 Kentriki Makedonia 72.33 57.33 35 
 Thessalia 69.33 55.33 35 
 Ipeiros 63.33 51.67 35 
 Dytiki Ellada 65.00 55.00 35 
 Peloponnisos 74.00 59.67 35 
 Voreio Aigaio 75.00 57.33 35 
Portugal Madeira 104.00 73.00 45 
Source: European Commission Communication (see footnote 61).  
7KHUHZDVDOVRVFRSHWRUHYLHZµF¶DUHDFRYHUDJH7KHFKDQJHVFRXOGLQYROYHXSWRSHUFHQWRIWKH
non-SUHGHILQHG µF¶ DUHD SRSXODWLRQ ,Q VRPH FRXQWLHV QDPHO\ Spain, Italy, and the United 
KingdomWKHµF¶DUHDSRSXODWLRQZKLFKFRXOGEHDPHQGHGZDVUHGXFHGEHFDXVHRIWKHHOLJLELOLW\RI
QHZ µD¶UHJLRQVXQGHUVWDQGDEO\QRQHRI WKHVHFRXQWULHVRSWHGWRDPHQGWKHPDSRI µF¶DUHDVZLWK
the result that coverage in these countries for 2017-20 is slightly higher than in 2014-2016.  
,QRWKHUVWKHVFRSHWRDPHQGWKHµF¶DUHDVGLGQRWDSSO\EHFDXVHWKHUHZHUHQRH[LVWLQJµF¶DUHDVRU
the country was already designated in its entirety (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Croatia, Latvia, LitKXDQLD0DOWD3RODQG5RPDQLD6ORYDNLD6ORYHQLDRUEHFDXVHDOO WKH µF¶DUHDV
ZHUHµSUH-GHILQHG¶E\WKHSRSXODWLRQGHQVLW\FULWHULRQ6ZHGHQ 
Among the remaining countries, few decided to make changes and these were minor: in Finland a 
small adjustment was made in involving several LAU2 areas, slightly increasing the overall population 
FRYHUDJH)LQODQGKDGQRWXVHGLWVIXOOµF¶DUHDTXRWDDWWKHRXWVHW64 In Germany, the NUTS 3 areas 
within Mecklenburg-Vorpommern were realigned with the new boundaries; this had no impact on 
population coverage but involved a minor change to the population covered by a higher aid intensity.65 
In Hungary the exchange of LAU2 areas involved a very slight reduction in population coverage.66 No 
other countries proposed any mid-WHUPUHYLHZRIµF¶DUHDV 
Separate from the mid-term review process, France opted to make a second use of the population 
UHVHUYH 7KH )UHQFK DXWKRULWLHV GLG QRW XVH WKH IXOO µF¶ DUHD TXRWD DW WKH RXWVHW LQLWLDOO\ OHDYLQJ D
population reserve of 233,757 inhabitants (0.36 percent of the national population), reduced to 
172,207 inhabitant after the first use of the reserve. In 2017 the Commission agreed to the proposal to 
add 52 municipalities comprising a population of 128,060 to the assisted areas map,67 still leaving a 
reserve of 44,147 for potential future use.  
                                                     
64
 State aid case no. SA.46345 ± Finland.  
65
 State aid case no. SA.46343 ± Germany.  
66
 State aid case no. SA.46346 ± Hungary. 
67
 State aid case no. SA.47094 ± France.  
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ANNEX II: ASSISTED AREA MAPS 2014-20 
Regional aid ceilings 2014-17 
 
Source: DG COMP. 
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Regional aid ceilings 2018-20 
 
Note: Subject to notifications and approvals following on from Commission Communication amending 
Annex I to the Guidelines on regional aid for 2014-20, OJEU C231/1 of 25 June 2016. 
Source: DG COMP. 
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ANNEX III: NATIONAL ASSISTED AREA MAPS 2014-20 
Assisted Areas in Austria 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Finland 2014-20 
Aid Area 1  
Article 107(3)(c) 
predefined 
Central Ostrobothnia 
Kainuu 
Lapland 
Northern Karelia 
Northern Ostrobothnia 
Northern Savonia 
Southern Savonia 
Aid Area 2 
Article 107(3)(c) 
non-predefined 
Salo 
Äänekoski 
Viiitasaari 
Pihtipudas 
 
 
State aid control of regional development policy at 60 
EPRP Paper No. 103  55 European Policies Research Centre 
Assisted Areas in France 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Germany 2014 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
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Assisted areas in Italy 
 
Note: The 2014-PDSGRHVQRWVKRZWKHµXSJUDGLQJ¶RI Sardegna to µD¶UHJLRQVWDWXs ± see Annex I. 
Sources: http://www.aiutidistato.org/project/carta-degli-aiuti-di-stato-regionali-italia/ 
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Assisted Areas in Norway 2014-20 (Investment Aid) 
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Assisted Areas in Poland 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in Sweden 2014-20 
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Assisted Areas in the United Kingdom 2014-20 
 
Note: WKHPDSGRHVQRWVKRZWKHµXSJUDGLQJ¶RI7HHV9DOOH\DQG'XUKDPWRµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXV± see Annex I. 
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EoRPA Research 
This paper has been written by Fiona Wishlade of the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC), 
initially drafted as a report produced for the EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research 
Consortium), which is a grouping of national government authorities from 12 European countries. The 
Consortium provides sponsorship for EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis 
of the regional policies of European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and 
Competition policies. EoRPA members have comprised the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and the Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x &RPPLVVDULDW*pQpUDOjO¶(JDOLWpGHVWHUULWRLUHV (General Commissariat for Territorial Equality, 
CGET, previously DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Digitalisierung (the Ministry for Economic Affairs, 
Science and Digitalisation), Saxony-Anhalt 
Italy 
x Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale (Agency for Territorial Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and 
Modernisation), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju (Ministry of Economic Development), Warsaw 
 
Portugal 
x Agência para o Desenvolvimento e Coesão (Agency for Development and Cohesion), Lisbon 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation), Stockholm 
 
Switzerland 
x Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs), Bern 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, London 
x Scottish Government, Glasgow 
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